An analysis of cost growth in the F/A airplane acquisition program. by Dyer, Joseph Wendell
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1981
An analysis of cost growth in the F/A airplane
acquisition program.
Dyer, Joseph Wendell

























AN ANALYSIS OF COST GROWTH







Thesis Co-Advisors: D. C.
Nickerson
Boger
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
T202G

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Of THIS »»Gt ,'«H(i D.n Emtn«
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
'WiloAf NOMlIK 2. GOVT ACCCISION NO
4. TITLE (*** Subilllm)
An Analysis of Cost Growth in the
F/A-18 Airplane Acquisition Program
7. AuTMO»i'«>
Joseph Wendell Dyer





J- RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
5. TYPE OF »EPO«T ft PERIOO COVEREO
Master's Thesis;
December 1981
S. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
• . CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERffJ
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT TASKAREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS





11. NUMBER OF PAGES
R MONlfoRlNG AGENCY NAME * AOORESSfl/ dlHorwnl from Controlling Ollleo)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
IS. SECURITY CLASS. Co/ thit ra>ert)
Unclassified
IS*. OECL ASSIFIC ATI ON/ DOWN GRADINGSCHEDULE
IS. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT iol tnl* Mrport)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of <no mmmtrmct antmrod In Block 20, II dlttotmni from Koport)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
IS. KEY WORDS (Cantitwm an rorsrto •(<*• II notamtmrr •"* identity my block ntdmmmt)
F-18, A-18, F/A-18, cost growth, weapon system acquisition,
inflation, index numbers, cost estimating, airplane/aircraft
procurement, aerospace systems cost growth.
10. ABSTRACT Continue an rmvmr— tide II nmcm»mmry mm* Identity my Hock WtlfJ
This research analyzes the F/A-18 airplane acquisition pro-
gram with respect to cost growth. It is noted that the develop-
ment estimate of total program cost addressed the acquisition of
only 800 airplanes, but that a decision was made in 1978 to
increase the inventory objective to 1366 airplanes. Additionally,
the estimates of inflation (escalation) issued by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense are observed to be lower than the
OD • .*• m 1473 EDITION OF I NOV SS IS OBSOLETE

£0Cu m»v CL. A»HHC*TlQW Q» TMIt »»»«<*— [Ww «<M—#
Block #20 Contd
inflation actually experienced by the F/A-18 contractors. It is
concluded that, as of December 1980, the program cost growth was
only 10 percent when adjustments are made for both the quantity
change and for actual inflation. It is further concluded that
the program managers had little control over cost growth. Con-
tinued inflation and possible failure to realize the expected
cost-quantity relationships are identified as likely areas of




Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
An Analysis of Cost Growth in
the F/A-18 Airplane Acquisition Program
by
Joseph Wendell Dyer
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B. S., North Carolina State University, 1969
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






This research analyzes the F/A-18 airplane acquisition pro-
gram with respect to cost growth. It is noted that the devel-
opment estimate of total program cost addressed the acquisition
of only 800 airplanes, but that a decision was made in 1978 to
increase the inventory objective to 1566 airplanes. Addition-
ally, the estimates of inflation (escalation) issued by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense are observed to be lower
than the inflation actually experienced by the F/A-18 contrac-
tors. It is concluded that, as of December 1980, the program
cost growth was only 10 percent when adjustments are made for
both the quantity change and for actual inflation. It is
further concluded that the program managers had little control
over cost growth. Continued inflation and possible failure
to realize the expected cost-quantity relationships are iden-




A. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 12
B. BACKGROUND --- 13
C. METHODOLOGY --- 14
D. LIMITATIONS --- 15
E. ORDER OF PRESENTATION 16
II. REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE RELATING TO
WEAPONS SYSTEM ACQUISITION 18
A. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND THE ACQUISITION
ENVIRONMENT 19
1. Program Management 20
2. Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council 23
3. Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System 27
4. Selected Acquisition Reports 35
B. METHODS, CONCEPTS, AND TECHNIQUES 38
1. Cost Estimation 38
2. Learning Curve 4 7
3. Engineering Changes 51
4. Contract Types 58
C. INFLATION AND MEASUREMENT OF INFLATION 6 3
1. Inflation 63
2. Index Numbers 66
3. Aerospace Price Indexes 76
D. CHAPTER II SUMMARY 77

III. ANALYSIS OF F/A-18 PROGRAM COST GROWTH 80
A. TOTAL PROGRAM COST ESTIMATE 31
1. Then Year Dollars 31
2. Base Year Dollars 84
3. Base Year Dollars- -Adjusted for
Inventory Objective 87
4. Magnitude of F/A-18 Cost Growth 89
B. A BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL PROGRAM ACQUISITION
COST 90
1. Development Cost 90
2. Procurement Cost 92
3. Military Construction Cost 93
4. Percentage Analysis (Breakdown) of
Total Program Cost Estimates 95
C. COST VARIANCE ANALYSIS - - 96
1. General - 96
2. Economic Variance 97
3. Quantity Variance -- 102
4. Schedule Variance 105
5. Engineering Variance 106
6. Estimating Variance 107
7. Support Variance 115
8. Variance Computation 116
D. MAGNITUDE OF F/A-18 COST GROWTH CONSIDERING
"ACTUAL" INFLATION 120
E. COST GROWTH- -PROGRAM MANAGER CONTROL 120
1. Economic Variance 121
2. Quantity Variance 122
6

3. Schedule Variance 122
4. Engineering Variance 123
5. Estimating Variance 123
6. Support Variance — 124
7. Degree of Program Manager Control 125
F. POSSIBLE FUTURE COST GROWTH 126
1. Future Economic Change 127
2. Future Quantity Change 129
3. Future Schedule Change 132
4. Future Engineering Change 132
5. Future Estimating Variance 132
6. Future Support Variance 138
G. CHAPTER III SUMMARY 139
IV. CONCLUSION - 140
A. GENERAL CONCLUSION 140
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 140
1. Major Elements of the F/A-18 Program 141
2. Total F/A-18 Program Cost Growth 142
3. F/A-18 Major Cost Growth Factors 144
4. Cost Growth Controllable by Program
Managers 147
5. Possible Future Cost Growth 149
6. Summary 150





APPENDIX E -- 2 20
LIST OF REFERENCES 223
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST - 227

LIST OF FIGURES
1. Abbreviated Naval Air Systems Command Organization -- 20
2. Vector of Organizational Energies 22
3. Acquisition Phases and Milestones 25
4. System Life Cycle Cost 25
5. Phases of the Federal Budget Process 28
6. Planning, Programming, § Budgeting System 30
7. The Five Year Defense Plan Data Base -- 33
8. Relative Uncertainty of Ultimate Time and Cost 41
9. Probability Distribution of Program Cost 42
10. Probability Distribution of Program Cost- -Competing
Systems -- 43
Estimates of Inflation- -The Dangers of Extrapolation 46
Learning Curves-Unit Cost-Quantity Relationships 47
The Learning Curve-Arithmetic Plot 49
Cost-Benefit Curve 53
Degree of Risk as a Function of Contract Type 62
Inflation and Monetary Growth 65
Budget Authority and Outlays 67
F/A-18 Total Program Cost Estimates- -Then Year
Dollars 82
F/A-18 Total Program Cost Estimates Then Year and
Base Year (1975) Dollars - 85
F/A-18 Total Program Cost - A Percentage Analysis
of Then Year Cost Estimates 86
F/A-18 Total Program Cost Estimates Then Year
Dollars and Base Year Dollars and Base Year Dollars
Adjusted to a Constant 800 Airplane Force 88
9

The Ratio of F/A-18 Current Estimates of Total
Program Cost to the Development Estimate of
Program Cost 89
F/A-18 Development Cost Estimates 91
F/A-18 Procurement Cost Estimates 93
F/A-18 Military Construction Cost Estimates 94
F/A-18 Total Program Cost Estimates- -Percentage
Analysis 96
F/A-18 Economic Variance 101
F/A-18 Development Estimate Cost Quantity Curve
(Unit, Flyaway) 102
F/A-18 Quantity Variance 104
F/A-18 Schedule Variance 105
F/A-18 Engineering Variance 107
F/A-18 Estimating Variance -- --108
F/A-18 Support Variance 116
Relative Magnitude of F/A-18 Cost Variance
Categories - 121
Estimated Flyaway Unit Cost - 131
F/A-18 Development Cost-Quantity Curve 134





1. Appropriations for the (Hypothetical) X-99
Airplane -- 67
2. X-99 Appropriations and Outlays 68
3. Assumed Annual Rates of Inflation 69
4. Assumed Price Level Index (PLI) Numbers 71
5. X-99 Appropriations and Outlays
(Inflation Adjusted) 73
6. Hypothetical OSD Price Level Index (PLI) 98
7. Original § Updated, Hypothetical OSD Price
Level Index (PLI) -- 99
Comparison of Inflation Rates 112
F/A-18 Program Unrecognized Inflation 114
Program Manager Control of F/A-18 Cost Growth 125
Evolution of the OSD Estimate of Inflation
(Procurement) for Fiscal Year 1980 127





The primary objective of this research is to realistically
determine the magnitude of the F/A-18 program cost growth, and
to identify the major factors which have contributed to this
cost growth. After the primary factors are identified, an
evaluation will be made to determine which cost growth factors
are controllable and which factors are uncontrollable by the
program manager. Finally, an attempt will be made to identify
possible areas of future cost growth.
A subsidiary objective is to crystallize and summarize
much of the literature pertinent to weapon systems cost and
thereby to provide program managers with a manageable source
of reference material.
A. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
Definitions of the following key terms are taken from
The Navy RDT§E Management Guide : [1: C-l]
Development Estimate - The estimates of operational/technical
characteristics, schedule and program acquisition cost for both
development and procurement when approval is given for the
program to move into full-scale development.
Current Estimate - The latest forecast of operational/
technical, schedule and program acquisition cost.
Cost Growth - The current estimate of program acquisition




The F/A-18 "HORNET" strike fighter is a single seat, twin
engine, jet airplane that is designed to operate both from
ashore and from aircraft carriers. This single airplane is
to be produced as a replacement for the aging F-4 fighter,
and the A- 7 and A-4 light attack airplanes. Initial Opera-
tional Capability (IOC) is scheduled for 1985. [2: 3]
The genesis of the F/A-18 1 was in the U.S. Air Force (USAF)
lightweight fighter competition between the General Dynamics
Corporation YF-16 and the Northrup Corporation YF-17. This
competition was decided by a competitive flyoff between proto-
type airplanes and was won by the General Dynamics Corporation,
single engine YF-16 in January of 1975. [3: 21]
The Department of Defense desire that there be a maximum
of commonality between U.S. Navy and U.S.A.F. aircraft assets
drove the Navy to strongly consider also selecting the YF-16.
However, the YF-16 was rejected primarily for three reasons:
1. The Navy believed that the relative capabilities of the
two airplanes were not demonstrated during the flyoff. (Northrup
had conceded a performance advantage because the YF-17 design
objectives related to maximum sustained maneuvering and
The F/A-18 was originally proposed to be produced as
separate fighter and attack models with high but not total
commonality. Later in the program development both missions
were incorporated into a single airframe/system.
Aircraft identification symbols: Y = prototype, A =
attack mission, and F = fighter mission.

acceleration were not realized until late in the competition.);
2. The YF-16 was not considered carrier adaptable because of
an angle-of -attack limitation required for deck clearance in
the landing configuration, and; 3. The Navy strongly desired
the added safety provided by a twin engine airplane. [3: 21]
Northrup, who had no recent experience in producing carrier
airplanes for the Navy, teamed with McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion (contractor for the F-4 airplane) and proposed a design
for a carrier-adapted YF-17. This design was selected by the
Navy in May of 1975 and the airplane was redesignated the F-18.
McDonnell Douglas then became the prime contractor. [3: 21]
C. METHODOLOGY
This research was conducted in three forms: archival
research, opinion research and analytic research.
The archival research centered around the F/A-18 program
Selected Acquisition Reports. The Selected Acquisition Reports
provide a standard, comprehensive summary status report which
reflects the program manager's current best estimate of cost
goals and compares these estimates with baseline parameters.
Congressional records, Office of the Secretary of Defense
studies and professional periodicals were also employed during
the archival research. Additionally, an extensive search of
literature relating to the program management environment,
to weapon system cost management methods, concepts, and tech-




Opinion research was conducted via interviews with present
and recently retired officials from the Naval Air Systems
Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Naval Material
Command, and from the Aerospace Industry. In total, over
forty-five interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C. and
St. Louis, Missouri. This opinion research focused on the
managerial, technical, and political background needed to
properly interpret the archival information.
Analytic methods were used to investigate the effects of




The limited available research time (approximately six
months) required that F/A-18 cost growth be analyzed in the
broad aggregate. Therefore, no attempt was made to identify
specific causal factors of program cost growth. An analysis
of program cost down to individual subcontractors and govern-
ment field activities levels would no doubt be enlightening,
but there the database grows geometrically, and becomes unman-
ageable by a single researcher.
Time limitations also precluded shoulder- to- shoulder com-
parisons of F/A-18 program cost growth history with that of
other tactical airplane acquisition programs.
A limitation was placed on the timeliness of archival
data utilized in this research. The latest archival data used
15

was as of December 1980. This information cut-off was estab-
lished because this was the latest data available which was
required to be in agreement with the President's annual budget
submission. The requirement for agreement between the Selected
Acquisition Report data and the budget submission provided
higher confidence in these data. No such "as of" restriction
was placed on the information collected during opinion research.
In an attempt to create an informal environment in which
interviewees could freely discuss weapons systems cost growth,
all interviewees were assured that they would only be identi-
fied by the position they held or had held.
E. ORDER OF PRESENTATION
This thesis is organized so that Chapter Two provides the
reader with the background needed to understand the analysis
presented in Chapter Three. Readers who are thoroughly familiar
with weapons system program management and measurements of
inflation may omit Chapter Two without loss. However, this
chapter provides a compilation of the multi-disciplinary
material relating to weapons system acquisition management in
general and system cost growth in particular. Chapter Three
analyzes the history of the F/A-18 program cost from the formu-
lation of the development estimate through the current estimate
of December 1980. The magnitude and controllability of program
cost growth is evaluated, areas of cost growth are identified,
and possible areas of future cost growth are discussed. Chapter
16

Four presents general and specific conclusions relating to
the analysis of F/A-18 program cost growth.
17

II. REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE RELATING
TO WEAPONS SYSTEM ACQUISITION
The purpose of this chapter is to survey the literature
pertinent to the research described in Chapter One. Sources
of bibliographic information included library card catalogues,
the Business Periodical Index, and a number of electronic data-
bases serviced and/or maintained by private industry and by
the Department of Defense. The non-government databases searched
included DIALOG (Lockheed Corporation) , ORBIT (SDC Corporation)
,
INFOBANK (New York Times) , and BRS (Bibliographic Retrieval
Services). The Department of Defense data bank, which yielded
the greatest information, was DLSIE or the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange. Keywords identified for the
database searcher were: cost growth, price analysis, material
acquisition, cost information reports, cost tracking, inflation,
index numbers, aerospace industries, and cost estimating.
The goals of this chapter are twofold. First, the material
that follows is designed to assist the reader in the interpre-
tation of the F-18 program cost growth analysis presented in
Chapter Three. Concepts and definitions presented here are
designed to provide a departure point and a focus for that
analysis. Secondly, it must be recognized that the literature
addressing weapon systems cost growth is multi -disciplinary
and often impresses readers as similar to the fabled blind
18

men describing an elephant. An attempt has been made to crys-
tallize and summarize much of the pertinent literature and
thereby to provide program managers with a manageable source
of reference material that will itself contribute to broaden-
ing of the body of knowledge.
This chapter is divided into three major divisions. The
first, Program Management, and the Acquisition Environment,
addresses the program management concept and then addresses
the Department of Defense acquisition and budgeting processes.
The major weapon system summary status report is also addressed
in this section. The next section, Methods, Concepts, and
Techniques, looks at establishment of a datum from which cost
growth is measured, system changes, production learning and
contract types. The last section, Inflation and Measurement
of Inflation, briefly touches upon some inflation theories
and then addresses the application of index numbers by track-
ing the cost of a hypothetical airplane (the X-99) program
during an inflationary period. Finally, some caution is urged
in application of purely aerospace price indexes.
A. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND THE ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
This section defines, depicts and discusses the program
management concept. Then, the acquisition environment is
discussed in terms of the major weapon system recommending
body (the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council) and
the funding process (the planning, programming, and budgeting
19

system.) Lastly, the selected acquisition report system is
defined and discussed. The F/A-18 Selected Acquisition Reports
are the main source of cost data which will be analyzed in
Chapter Three.
1 . Program Management
Program management is the central organizational mech-
anism for integrating the Department of Defense research,
development, test, and evaluation efforts required for systems
acquisition. The central tenet of program management is or-
ganization by output or purpose [1: 1-7]. The program manager
is appointed to be the advocate of that purpose and is held
accountable for program success [4: 87].
a. Matrix Organization
Using Figure 1, observations and analysis made
by Hellriegel and Slocum of a project management (matrix)
organization in a commercial industrial situation can be applied














Figure 1. Abbreviated Naval Air Systems Command Organization
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Functional managers (Engineering, Test and Evalu-
ation, etc.) are responsible to the Commander, Naval Air
Systems Command for their activities. The program manager is
chartered by, and reports to, the same top manager and has
personnel from the functional divisions (and from field activ-
ities) assigned to him as required on a temporary basis.
Clearly, there are dual authority relationships associated
with each of these "temporary" program team members. Hellriegel
and Slocum state:
The project manager's authority flows horizontally across
the superior- subordinate relationships existing within the
functional activities of an organization. Throughout the
life span of a given project, personnel at various levels
and with varying skills must contribute their efforts to
allow for the sequential development of the pro j ect . . .His
(the project manager's) authority is de facto and stems
from his charge from top management to get the project done
within time and cost constraints. In practice, the project
manager must rely heavily upon his peers through negotia-
tions, knowledge and resolutions of conflict. These rela-
tionships replace the lack of formal authority over all
the resources needed to complete the project.
A model published by Hicks can be adapted to cast some
further light on the responsibilities of a program manager.
[6: 21-22]
The vector of energies expended by functional
elements of an organization without the focus provided by a
program manager is depicted in Figure 2a.
These energies are directed toward accomplishment
of individual institutionalized functional goals and respon-
sibilities. The formation of a program office and chartering
of a single individual as program manager serves to redirect












Figure 2. Vector of Organizational Energies
toward the program goal. (Note that some functional elements
"line up" in support of the program goals better than others.)
Archibald has noted that functional management can be seen
as "divisive" management since the organization is divided
along functional lines, while program management, like general
management, is "integrative" in nature. [7: 35]
b. Forces Behind Program Management
John Kenneth Galbraith describes six "imperatives
of technology" which he believes are at work pushing organi-
zations toward the project management approach: [8: 25-28]
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1. The time span between initiation and completion of a
project is increasing.
2. The capital commitment to a program prior to actual
use of the end product is increasing.
3. With increasing technology, the commitment of time and
money tend to be made more inflexibly
.
4. Technology requires more and more specialized manpower .
5. The inevitable counterpart of specialization is organization
6. More effective planning and control are required because
of all of the above.
Certainly these technological imperatives are
operative within the defense establishment.
2 . Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
When David Packard took over as Deputy Secretary of
Defense in 1969, he was given primary responsibility for De-
fense Acquisition Policy. He quickly undertook a number of
policy initiatives designed to improve the existing acquisi-
tion environment. First, among these was to "provide for
systematic program reviews at important decision milestones
by a group of senior officials in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense." [9: 1]
This program review process was codified in Department
of Defense Directive 5000.1 of 1975 and was known as the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).~ [9: 2]
Mr. Packard served as Deputy Secretary of Defense from
1969 to 1971.
Changes to the DSARC are currently being discussed by
the Reagan Administration. A 30 April, 1981, memorandum from
23

The DSARC serves as an advisory body whose principal members
include: [10: 3-4]
° The Defense Acquisition Executive
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
o Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering
o Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
o Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve
Affairs, and Logistics)
o Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis
and Evaluation)
o Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
These council members, assisted by other defense and
service personnel, render "decisions" (really recommendations)
at major program Milestones I, II, and III. These milestones
are depicted in Figure 3 [11: 1-8].
The acquisition process emerges from fleet operational
experience, technological advances and intelligence assessment
of the threat. All of these are integrated through ongoing
mission area analysis. If a need of sufficient importance
and priority is identified, a mission element need statement
(MENS) will be written by the service and submitted to the
Secretary of Defense. [12: 5]
Emphasis on the "front end" or problem definition
(mission need) is required. As may be seen in Figure 4, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, discussing these
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SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE. OSARC MILESTONES
Figure 4. System Life Cycle Cost
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Navy Program Manager's Guide maintains that approximately 70%
of a system's life cycle cost is predetermined by the concept
chosen to meet the mission need. [11: 1-6]
If the MENS is approved (Milestone 0) , the Secretary
of Defense directs the service to initiate Phase and there-
in, "systematically and progressively explore and develop
alternative system concepts to satisfy the approved need."
[1: 2-25, 11: 1-9] (There is no DSARC meeting/decision at
Milestone 0.)
At Milestone 1, after the service has completed the
competitive exploration of alternative system concepts to
the point where the selected alternatives warrant system
demonstration, the Service Secretary requests approval to
proceed with demonstration and validation [1: 2-22]. This
request is reviewed and a recommendation is made by DSARC
(Milestone 1) prior to the Secretary of Defense's decision.
If the Secretary approves, models are fabricated to demonstrate
and validate the critical technical and operational features
of the selected concepts (Phase 1). [11: 1-10]
If Phase I is successfully completed, the service
requests permission to initiate full scale development. Again,
the DSARC meets to make a recommendation to the Secretary of
No research or statistical evidence was offered in the
Navy Program Manager's Guide to support 70% or the other per
centages shown on this figure. One of the editors of that





Defense (Milestone II). If he gives his blessing, the program
enters Phase II where the goal is to produce a fully tested,
documented, and production-engineered design of the selected
concept (s) from Phase I [11: 1-10]. This full scale system
is subjected to both technical and operational test and eval-
uation during Phase II.
If Phase II is successfully completed, the service
requests via DSARC, (Milestone III), that the Secretary of
Defense grant permission to proceed with the planned procure-
ment and fleet introduction of the selected system [11: 1-11].
Thus, DSARC does provide the Department of Defense
with a control mechanism by reviewing program progress at
major decision points distributed throughout the program
evolution.
3 . Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
a. Federal Budget Process
Before presenting the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS) the more general budget process will
be briefly addressed. The purpose of the Federal budget
process is to allocate scarce national resources among com-
peting public demands [13: A-3]. Figure 5 depicts the main
three phases of the process: (1) Executive Formulation;
(2) Congressional Enactment; and (3) Budget Execution. In
the Defense Department Executive Formulation is carried out
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Figure 5. Phases of the Federal Budget Process
It is important to recognize that each of these
main phases interrelates and overlaps. For example, a Defense
Department program manager would have been concurrently in-
volved in executing (spending) the Fiscal Year (FY) 1979
budget appropriations; testifying before Congress in support
of the FY 1980 budget enactment, and planning for the FY 1981
budget. All this would have been transpiring during the month
of February, 1979.
Note also that within each budget cycle there is
a two year time delay from the initiation of budget planning




McKinney and Howard state that PPBS provides a
method or approach whereby, "objectives and resources and
their interrelations are taken into account to achieve a
coherent whole. Three major concepts underlie PPBS." [14: 3267]
° Development in [an] agency of an analytical capability
to examine in depth both agency objectives and the vari-
ous programs to meet the objectives;
o Formulation of a multi-year (at least five years) planning
and programming process coupled with a sophisticated
management information system; and
° Creation of an improved budgetary mechanism that can
facilitate broad program decisions, translate them into
more refined decisions in a budgetary context, and then
present the results for executive and legislative action.
The PPBS approach is premised on questions such
as the following:
° What are the basic goals and objectives being sought?
o What are the alternative means for achieving the stated
goals and objectives?
o What are the comprehensive costs (present, future, and
full of each alternative, both in financial and non-financial
terms?
What are the benefits to be achieved from each alternative
and how effective will each be in achieving the stated
goals and objectives?
c. Department of Defense PPBS Process
In keeping with concepts discussed above, the
Department of Defense instituted PPBS in the early 1960's.
The goal was to facilitate budgeting in terms of forces and
systems rather than resource categories [15: 71]. The pro-
gression is from general articulation of national military
29

strategy and objectives to specific programs, organizations
and forces necessary to carry out the strategy and objectives
A model for viewing the Department of Defense
PPBS is provided in Figure 6 [13: A-12].
The planning phase of PPBS is initiated with sub-
mission of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and
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Figure 6. Planning, Programming, § Budgeting System
30

The JSPD provides the views of the uniformed
military (Joint Chiefs of Staff) on policy objectives, national
military strategy, and force levels. The JSPD is not fiscally
constrained and is based on short-, mid-, and long-range
intelligence studies. This document is published in early
fall and is an input into the Consolidated Guidance.
The Consolidated Guidance is prepared for the
Secretary of Defense by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Program Analysis and Evaluation) with inputs from throughout
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Consolidated
Guidance contains a statement of fundamental policy and ratio-
nale underlying the defense program. Programming and fiscal
guidance is also included to provide the services with the
information needed to develop their programs. After a draft
is discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Ser-
vice Secretaries, a revised Consolidated Guidance is released
to the Services in March.
The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) is the
programming link or bridge between planning and budgeting.
It is here, in the programming phase of PPBS , where a program
gains approval for development by standing up to competition
against alternative means of accomplishing the same purposes
and alternative uses of the same resources.
The POM is a definite statement on how the service
intends to carry out their responsibilities with respect to
31

the national strategy. The "how" is constrained by the fiscal
guidance in the consolidated guidance.
The POM is transmitted to the Secretary of Defense
via the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs review the
POM's (one is prepared by each service) and write the Joint
Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) . This memorandum is
the Joint Chiefs of Staff view on the risk associated with the
POM. (Remember that the POM is fiscally constrained whereas
the JSPD was not)
.
After the POM and the JPAM are received, the Sec-
retary of Defense reviews the memoranda and identifies alter-
natives for those issues where the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Service differ. After the Joint Chiefs and
the services have an opportunity to reclama, the Secretary of
Defense issues the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) . The
PDM is the Secretary of Defense's decisions on acquisition
programs, force levels, and levels of support. The issuance
of this PDM is the end of the programming phase of PPBS.
Upon receipt of the PDM, the service prepares
firm budget estimates of the cost of the programs approved
in the PDM. These budget estimates are sent directly to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for further analysis.
The Secretary of Defense holds budget hearings
with the Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of
Management and Budget. Following these hearings, the Secretary
32

formulates his budget decisions. These budget decisions are
then submitted for incorporation in the President's budget
4
which is submitted to the Congress.
d. Five Year Defense Plan
The Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is an official
Office of the Secretary of Defense publication which summarizes
the approved plans and programs of the Department of Defense
components. More simply stated, it is the management infor-
mation system (database) that supports the PPBS . The FYDP
records, summarizes and displays budget decisions that have
been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The FYDP is struc-







MAJOR FYDP PROGRAMS FOR MILITARY
MISSION OR COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT
Figure 7. The Five Year Defense Plan Data Base
Changes to the Department of Defense PPBS are currently
being discussed by the Reagan Administration. A 2" March 1981
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This structure allows different aggregations of
data that would be meaningful to different managers. For ex-
ample, a researcher or analyst seeking information on F-18
airplane research and development budgets could query this
PPBS database by defining the year of interest and (X, Y, Z)
coordinates. He would find the needed information under:
(RDT§E appropriations, general purpose forces, planes).
The FYDP is updated in October, after Congres-
sional action on the appropriations bill, in January after the
President submits his budget and in May based on the POM.
[13: A-9]
e. PPBS - DSARC Interface
It should be recognized that DSARC is "event"
oriented. That is, a program proceeds from one DSARC milestone
to another by accomplishing technological goals, (i.e. success-
fully completing the validation and demonstration phase followed
by receiving a DSARC recommendation to proceed with full scale
development.) This can take several years. On the other hand
PPBS is "time" oriented. PPBS runs on a tightly structured
schedule of 24 months from beginning of planning until comple-
tion of enactment [11: 2-25]. Since major acquisition program
decisions are made in the context of both DSARC and PPBS, there
is a coordination problem. Decisions made through the DSARC
memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C.
Carlucci discussing these changes is provided in Appendix B

process must be reflected in the FYDP. This is accomplished
via the POM. Successfully passing a DSARC milestone is no
assurance of funding, and inclusion in the POM does not assure
that the budget will not be cut downstream. If a DSARC mile-
stone is completed "out of phase" with the POM process sig-
nificant funding delays may be experienced. The program
manager must follow these processes carefully, for his funding
is in jeopardy at each step. [11: 2-25-2-27]
f. PPBS in Perspective
Charles Schultze, who at the time was director
of the Bureau of the Budget, summarized a perspective of
PPBS: [16]
Learned articles have treated (PPBS) sometimes as the great-
est thing since the invention of the wheel. Others attack
it, either as a naive attempt to quantify and computerize
the imponderable, or as an arrogant effort on the part of
latter day technocrats to usurp the decision-making function
in a political democracy.
PPB is neither. It is a means of helping responsible offi-
cials make decisions. It is not a mechanical substitute
for good judgement, political wisdom and leadership of
those officials....
4 . Selected Acquisition Reports
Department of Defense Instruction 7000.3 is the con-
trolling document that sets forth the Selected Acquisition
Reports (SAR) Program.
a. Objectives
The SAR is the standard, comprehensive summary
status report on major defense acquisition programs. This
report reflects the Program Manager's current best estimate
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of performance, schedule, and cost goals and compares these
estimates with baseline estimates established at DSARC Mile-
stone II when the program was approved for full scale develop
ment . The SAR is not designed to be a decision document, but
rather a standardized information reporting document. It
has been likened to a "snapshot" taken at the end of each
quarter reflecting a weapon system program's overall status.
b. Applicability
SAR coverage is normally limited to those weapon
system acquisition programs that are expected to experience
total cumulative financing for research, development, test
and evaluation of over $100 million or cumulative production
investment in excess of $500 million. (SAR coverage may also
be directed by the Secretary of Defense for programs of major
interest regardless of expected financing requirement.)
c. History [17: 9]
The SAR was conceived by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) in 1967 as an internal Department
of Defense managerial report. However, in 1967, Senator
John Stennis (D-Miss) , Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, requested that he be provided with periodic status
reports on major weapon systems. The Secretary of Defense
decided to use the SAR to fulfill this requirement. In 1975
this request for information was formalized in Public Law
94-106, and the SAR is now used throughout all Congressional




The SAR's are formatted to address the following
areas: [18: 2-2-2-27]
(1) References - displays most of the programmatic infor-
mation on the weapon system and includes system
description and mission.
(2) Summary - briefly states the significant development
from program inception and focuses on major events
and changes since last report.
(3) Operational /Technical Characteristics - lists the
quantifiable design goals and reports demonstrated
performance so far accomplished.
(4) Schedule Milestones - provides information concerning
key program milestones encompassing the entire period
from program initiation to award of first full-scale
production contract.
(5) Program Acquisition Cost - summarizes all changes to
both costs and quantities which have occurred since
establishment of the program baseline. "
(6) Contractor Cost - reports contractor cost information
on all active prime and associate prime contracts
valued in excess of $5 million.
(7) Variance Analysis - summarizes the reasons for changes
from the baseline values.
(8) Budget Year and Out Year Programs - provides a break-
down by fiscal year of program acquisition cost and
escalation applicable to the "Budget Year" and "Balance
to Complete" segments of the current estimate.
(9) Cost Quantity Curves - provides for recurring unit
flyaway cost-quantity constant dollars.
The SAR provides analysts and researchers with a very useful
tool. This document, referenced to an approved baseline, pro-
vides a comprehensive and continuous record of changes throughout
a program evolution.

B. METHODS, CONCEPTS, AND TECHNIQUES
This section discusses cost estimating techniques and
the uncertainty implicit in preparing cost estimates. Cost
estimates prepared very early in a program evolution provide
the baseline from which cost growth is measured. An appreci-
ation of cost estimate formulation is important to the analysis
presented in Chapter Three. Next, the learning curve concept
is addressed, as it applies to cost-quantity relationships.
Engineering changes are discussed. Lastly, contract types
are discussed as techniques for cost control.
1 . Cost Estimation
Cost estimation methods provide the datum from which
cost growth is measured. Every phase of defense planning,
programming and budgeting is based on cost estimation and
accuracy is a fundamental requirement if intelligent decisions
are to be made with respect to effective employment of scarce
dollar resources.
Cost estimating responsibilities for proposed Naval
Aircraft Development Programs lie with by the Naval Air Systems
Command. Independent cost estimations are made by the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations before initiation of the
DSARC. Within the Department of Defense, the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG) provides the Defense Systems Acquisi-
tion Review Council with a review and evaluation of both the





Mainly two cost estimating methodologies are
employed within the Department of Defense. One is an indus-
trial engineering approach; the other is a Parametric Costing
Technique
.
The industrial engineering technique requires a
detailed knowledge of final design. This method breaks the
production process into basic building blocks and calculates
all the parts, materials, and manhours required to construct
the aggregate system. [19: 3]
The parametric costing technique starts with the
overall characteristics of the system (such as size, complex-
ity, or performance level,) and derives an estimate of cost.
The derivation is based on a statistical analysis of the
relationship between performance characteristics and physical
characteristics experienced in logically related systems [19: 3;
1: 2-25].
The industrial engineering techniques require a
detailed and thorough knowledge of production methods. But,
since the Government engages in very little actual production
activity, this method may be better suited to estimates pro-
duced by contractors than to Department of Defense cost estimates
Parametric cost estimating has enjoyed laudable
success. As an example, NASA estimated the cost of the Apollo
moon landing program ($20 billion) using parametric methods to
39

within three percent when corrected for unexpected inflation
[20: 125].
b. Estimates Reported in Selected Acquisition Reports
Once prepared, by whichever method, cost estimates
are reported in the SAR. The following are definitions of
estimates used in the SAR; the nomenclature indicates when
the estimate was made: [1: C-l]
o Planning Estimate - The estimates of operational/technical
characteristics, schedule and program acquisition cost
(for both development and procurement) when approval is
given for program initiation (Milestone 0)
.
Development Estimate - The estimates of operational/
technical characteristics, schedule and program acquisi-
tion cost for both development and procurement when approval
is given for the program to move into full-scale develop-
ment (Milestone II) .
o Current Estimate - The latest estimate operational/
technical characteristics, schedule and program acquisi-
tion cost to acquire the inventory objective quantity,




As a program progresses in time the current esti-
mate often begins to differ from the development estimate.
This is because no estimating method can perfectly consider
those future items that are unknown or those upcoming problems
that are not recognized at program initiation. Consider
Figure 8 which is an illustration (adapted to DSARC process)
offered by Archibald [7: 23].
Note that the estimated cost for a program is





















Figure 8. Relative Uncertainty of Ultimate Time and Cost
Early in a program life the area of the circle is large,
reflecting the relative uncertainty of initial estimates.
As a program matures the current estimates will be refined
and the uncertainty (shaded) area will decrease in size re-
flecting decreased uncertainty. The location of the center
of the shaded area will move left or right as the estimated
scheduled time of development completion becomes more firm,




However, cost estimates communicated with Congress
in the Selected Acquisition Reports are reported as point
estimates; that is, the location of the center of the uncer-
tainty area on the vertical axis. Herein lies much of heartache
of cost estimation accuracy. A point estimate does not provide
any insight into the size of the area of uncertainty. Many
researchers and analysts have proposed that point estimates
of ultimate cost be replaced by a report of a confidence
interval
.
As an example, the probability distribution of a




Figure 9 Probability Distribution of Program Cost
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To report only the cost with the highest proba-
bility (c, a point estimate) is to withhold the assessment
of program uncertainty.
It would be more meaningful to provide decision
makers with a confidence interval that said the estimators
have considered the uncertainties associated with the program
and are 95 percent confident that the program cost will lie
between a and b.
To gain more insight into the possible folly of
dependence upon point estimates alone, consider the graph of












Figure 10 Probability Distribution of Program Cost
Competing Systems

The point estimate of the cost of System II (c') is lower
than the point estimate of the cost of System I (c) . Based
upon point estimates of cost alone (and assuming equality of
performance and schedule) a decision maker would decide to
proceed with System II. But note that the cost estimators
are 95 percent certain that the cost of System I will lie
between a and b; a very narrow interval. The 95 percent
confidence interval from System II is much broader and extends
from a' to b' where b' is very much greater than b. If the
confidence intervals are analyzed and risk is considered, a
decision maker provided with this additional information may
decide to proceed with System I even though it has a larger
expected probable cost. To do otherwise is to risk experi-
encing the very large program cost b'.
d. Estimation of Economic Change
A major source of estimating errors in all pro-
grams has been inflation. Until approximately 1970 it was
not common to include the effects of inflation (escalation)
in program cost estimates [21: 18]. But during the mid to
late seventies and early eighties inflation estimating errors
began to constitute a large part of overall program cost
estimation error. Accurately estimating inflation rates has
proven illusive even though many complex econometric models





Some of the uncertainty involved in predicting
future inflation rates can be observed by using a simple
linear regression model. This model assumes that there is
an underlying linear relationship between time and inflation;
and further, that the inflation rate observed (sampled) in
any one year is a random variable with some probability dis-
tribution around the underlying linear function. (See
Wonnacott and Wonnacott for an explanation of regression
theory [22: 331-355].)
If the assumed 1990 to 1995 inflation rates are
plotted, regressed to a straight line and then extrapolated
forward to future years, the results would appear as in Figure
11.
In year 1993, for which sample data was assumed
available, it is indicated that one could 95 percent confi-
dent that the mean inflation rate was really between 7.64
percent and 4.17 percent. However, if this line is extrap-
olated forward in time the width of the confidence interval
quickly broadens. Based on data collected from 1990 to 1995
it would be estimated that the mean inflation rate in 1999
would be expected to be 15.95 percent. But, to be 95 percent
confident that the 1990 mean inflation rate was bounded, it
would have to be reported that the 1990 mean inflation rate
This model is offered as an example in which uncertainty
can be depicted. The intent is not to indicate that simple
regression would be a good inflation model.
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could be anywhere between 9.39 percent and 22.51 percent.
And that would only be true if the underlying assumption
(linearity) of the model was true. Certainly that assumption
is not well founded. Unbeknownst to the analyst working in
1995, the 1996 election of a president with a vastly differ-
ent national economic program could turn around the trend of
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Estimates of Inflation- -The Dangers of Extrapolation
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2 . Learning Curve
a. Learning Curve Theory
One important method utilized in estimating the
total unit production cost of a program involves the theory
of learning curves. Simply stated the learning curve theory
is that as the total quantity of units produced doubles, the
cost per unit decreases by some constant percentage. Graphic
examples of this learning curve effect are presented in Figure
12.
too
15 20 30 40 50 80 100 150 200 300 400
UNITS (QJ
1000
Figure 12. Learning Curves-Unit Cost-Quantity Relationships
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This figure shows the cost of subsequent units
of production given learning curves (which plot as straight
lines on log-log paper) with "slopes" of 90 percent, 80 per-
cent and 70 percent. Consider the learning curve with the
80 percent "slope." An 80 percent "slope" learning curve is
one in which the product cost after a doubling of quantity
would be 80 percent of the former cost. As an example, since
the 10th unit produced cost approximately $47.50 then we
would expect the 20th unit to list for approximately 80 per-
cent of $47.50 or about $58.00.
More generally, the unit learning curve theory





Where C. represents the cost of the unit
number i
.
A. represents the theoretical cost
of the first unit, and
B = In (Learning Curve "slope")
In 2
Where the slope is expressed in
decimal form. [23: 2028-2029]
This learning curve equation tells how learning
(as measured by performance of a task) progresses over time
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as the number of opportunities for performing the task in-
creases. Learning increases rapidly at first as obvious
inefficiencies are identified and corrected and the basic
task is mastered. But, as time progresses, and more and
more units have been produced, the rate of learning decreases
and approaches an asymptote. This is easier to see on an
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Figure 13 The Learning Curve-Arithmetic Plot
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It is important to realize that the learning
leading to those cost reduction in a manufacturing process
is attributable not only to direct workers (dexterity) but
also to management action (e.g. work simplification and engi-
neering changes). [23: 2025-2026]
b. Theory Development
The learning curve theory was developed by T. P.
Wright during the 1930 *s and was applied by the aircraft
industry during World War II. The theory provided a much
improved method of predicting cost, estimating manpower re-
quirements, and setting prices [24: I-l-I-ll].
Two factors found in the aerospace industry seem
necessary for successful application of the theory. These
factors include, first, the building of a sizable, complex
end-item that requires a large number of direct labor hours,
and second, production in which unmechanized assembly opera-
tions predominate. These factors and the theory in general
were validated by a Stanford University study of United States
Aircraft production history in World War II. [23: 20-28]
c. Theory Application
Identification of the proper "slope" and the
theoretical cost of the first unit (A.) are complex problems
when one uses the learning curve theory to estimate production
cost. The expected "slope" is usually derived from a company's
previous experience with similar items or components. The
proper A, is more difficult to decide upon because the real
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first unit of a complex item will probably be a prototype
model used in ironing out design problems. As such the cost
of this real first unit will be unrealistically high. There-
fore, the theoretical cost of the first unit should not be
that of this prototype model but that of the first true pro-
duction unit. [24: VII-2]
3 . Engineering Changes
One of the foremost concerns of any program manager
is controlling engineering changes. An engineering change
is any alteration in the physical or functional character-
istics of a system or item delivered, to be delivered, or
under development after establishment of such characteristics.
[1: A-7] Such changes may include the addition of new work,
the deletion of work, or the modification of work currently
specified. These changes are generally considered to add to
weapon system cost. Certainly, after completion of planning
for, and installation of, a production process any change
will at least initially prove organizationally dysfunctional.
(For example, changing even a simple process may require a
major industrial engineering effort to rebalance an assembly
line.) Archibald, in his widely read Managing High-Technology
Programs and Projects
,
discusses the need to firmly establish
a design freeze point to suppress dysfunctional change [7: 190]
However, freezing the design of a major weapon system
is very difficult if not impossible. Perhaps the best a pro-
gram manager can hope to do is "rigidly control" engineering
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changes. The literature discusses engineering change at
great length; most often offered as causes of engineering
changes are the following:
° Bringing system performance up to expected standards.
° Incorporation of advances in the state of the art.
° Concurrency.
o Striving for technical perfection.
o Buy-ins.
a. Bring System Performance up to Expected Standards
The operational and technical characteristics of
a weapon system are formalized at DSARC II and are reported
as goals in the SAR. But what happens during the develop-
ment, test and evaluation phases when the performance demon-
strated falls short of those goals? The program manager is
faced with two choices: First, expend resources to improve
the system so that it will meet or at least come closer to
those goals, or sell the user organization on the fact that
the demonstrated performance is "good enough."
The question of whether to expend more resources
in search of better performance is usually addressed in a
cost-benefit analysis context [25: 25-26]. Consider Figure
14 as an example of Cost-Benefit (Performance) analysis of
improving maximum airspeed of a tactical airplane.
If the maximum air speed demonstrated during
flight test is a, knots and a large improvement can be gen-

















Figure 14. Cost-Benefit Curve
cost growth required to obtain the performance goal a 9 . That
is, the ratio of the added Benefit (Performance) to cost AY
A*
is attractive. However, were the demonstrated performance
to be b, knots and the goal b 7 knots, the analysis would be
much less favorable. In this latter case only a small im-
provement in performance (AY ) would be returned for expending
$AX. Is that little bit of added performance really worth
the cost growth that would be suffered? That is a nontrivial
problem. If this higher performance level (b 9 ) is required
to win the air battle that would be one thing, but how was
this level determined and specified?

Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) speaking at the University of California,
Berkeley, in 1965 stated, "Suspicion persists in some influ-
ential quarters that somehow or other cost-effectiveness
(another name for Cost-Benefit) studies put dollars before
national security." [26: 38] But, Hitch goes on to point
out
:
To anyone trained in economics, this is a most puzzling
attitude. We know that the very act of making a choice--
and that is all we are doing- -involves weighing the utility
or benefit to be gained against the cost which must be
incurred. Why is that so? It is so because benefits
"cost" resources and we live in a world in which resources
are limited. If we use more for one purpose, less remains
for other purposes - -even in as rich a nation as the United
States. [26: 38]
b. Incorporation of Advances in the State of the Art
There is a decreasing lag time between the dis-
covery and application of scientific knowledge. Hence, it
is not unusual for weapon system developments extending over
a number of years to have the opportunity (sometimes the
necessity) to embrace new technology offering large increases
in capability. A new Navy submarine, approved as of the
summer of 1956, called for building a missile based on per-
formance characteristics attainable in 1958 to be used with
the submarine scheduled to be ready for service in 1965. As
the program progressed it became apparent that newer solid-
fueled ballistic missile technology offered the Navy far
greater capabilities. That new missile, named the Polaris,
was to resist obsolescence well into the 19"0's. To have
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resisted incorporation of more advanced state of the art
technology in the name of cost control would have been to
produce a system that was outdated prior to commissioning.
[27: 30-31]
c. Concurrency
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 charges
program managers with the objective to achieve initial opera-
tional capability within the time dictated by the need or
threat [10: 12]. One of the recommended ways to meet this
schedule goal is with planned concurrency. Concurrency is
defined as overlapping, combining, or omitting phases of the
acquisition process. With the F-1S program, for example,
the Navy has practiced concurrency by simultaneously conduct-
ing flight testing and proceeding with initial production.
Even though the flight test program identified performance
problems that required correction via engineering changes,
the Navy adhered to its tight program schedule. [28: 12]
Mr. David Packard, while Assistant Secretary of
Defense, condemned currency, saying , "Engineering changes that
are made on the production line are costly and wasteful. They
generate waste, real waste, as you all know right down through
the subcontractor structure." [29: 23-24] One can accept
Mr. Packard's argument that concurrency leads to waste, or
one can view the cost growth that concurrency precipitates
as the price paid for timeliness.
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d. Striving for Technical Perfection
An unidentified program manager has been quoted
as saying: [50: 35]
Design engineers will fiddle and tinker forever. If you
let them alone, you are guaranteed to have schedule slip-
pages and cost growth problems. Nothing will come out of
the end of the pipe unless you push it out.
Such a comment does not set well with many engi-
neers, including this writer. Engineers recognize that cost
and schedule as well as technical requirements are inputs
into the design equation. Establishment and maintenance of
cost and schedule constraints are however, management, not
engineering responsibilities. But, if engineering changes
are approved by management purely in search of unrequired
technical betterment unwarranted cost growth and schedule
slippage will result [30: 27]
e. Buy-ins
It is conceivable that a contractor might delib-
erately underbid to get a contract and then overestimate the
cost involved in incorporating engineering changes in order
to recoup losses. This phenomenon is known as a buy- in and
is an emotional issue with government contracting officers.
A Naval Postgraduate School contract management professor
states that contractor buy-ins are a serious problem.
Padgett reasoned, in his statistical study of
defense contracts, that if underbidding was a factor in cost
overruns, then the type of contract should have some effect
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on the degree to which it occurs [31: 56]. That is, firm
fixed price contracts should have the smallest overruns be-
cause there is an inherent penalty for overruns and a reward
for underruns. On the other hand, cost plus fixed fee con-
tracts should have the highest overruns since there are no
explicit penalties for overruns or reward for underruns. The
results of Padgett's regression analyses were generally incon
elusive (i.e. not statistically significant) [31: 101].
This researcher has been unable to locate any
quantitative research which statistically supports buy-ins
as a serious problem on weapon system cost overruns,
f. Cost Reduction
Not all engineering changes contribute to cost
growth; some changes result in cost reductions. The litera-
ture discusses engineering changes designed to reduce cost
primarily in relationship to design- to-cost contracts.
The Government Accounting Office has expressed
the concern that, with the introduction of design- to-cost
goals, engineers will vector more of their attention to
reduction of production cost and less toward technological
innovativeness . [32: 12] This could, they say, slow the
pace of major technological breakthrough.
"Design to Cost" is a management concept wherein rigor-
ous cost goals are established during development, and the
cost control of systems cost to these goals is achieved by
practical trade-offs between operational capability, perform
ance, cost and schedule. [l: A-6]
57

The General Accounting Office observes in the
same report that many systems have been designed with growth
potential by providing more space than needed at first. Often
times improvements made later in the system life cycle were
made at relative low cost by taking advantage of the over-
design. [32: 11] However, if this overdesign is sacrificed
to maintain design to cost goals, later system modifications
will have to be made at a higher cost. The result could be
a net increase in life-cycle cost.
4 . Contract Types
One of the major techniques available for program
cost control is the wide variety of available contract types.
In aggregate there are basically two types of contracts which
a program manager may employ: fixed price contracts and
cost-type contracts.
Lee and Dobler identify some important factors that
influence contract type selection: [33: 116]
o The intensity of competition among vendors.
o The vendor's cost and production experience in manufac-
turing similar items.
o The availability, accuracy, and reliability of pricing
data.
o The extent of the business risk involved.
The fixed price type contract maximizes the possible
profit which a contractor (producer) can earn, but also max-
imizes his risk. From the buyer's point of view this type
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of contract offers low risk and minimum administrative require
ments and motivates the contractor to produce efficiently.
[33: 117].
On the other hand, cost-type contracts are used when
it is impossible or unfair to arrange fixed-price contracts.
Here the buyer assumes the financial risk and the contractor
agrees only to give his best efforts to complete the contract
within the estimated cost provided in the contract. With
cost-type contracts, however, the contractor is under no fur-
ther obligation if, despite his efforts, the material or
service contracted for is not fully provided at the time he
expends all the funds in the contracts. [11: 3-36]
a. Acquisition Phases and Contract Types
The Navy Program Manager's Guide discusses con-
tract types in relation to acquisition phases [11: 3-38-3-39].
This guide recommends fixed price type contracts during the
concept exploration phase (DSARC Phase 0) because the product
(a paper report) is clearly established and because this type
contract provides the only means of putting competing con-
tractors on equal footing. The guide cautions, however, that
the contract dollar amount for Phase should be sufficient
to pay for the work requested, less contractors spend their
own funds in an attempt to "buy-in."
The guide recommends fixed-cost type contracts
also for the Demonstration and Validation Phase (Phase I) for
the same reasons as those presented for Phase 0. The argument
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is that even though potential uncertainties (and therefore
risk), are greater, equally funded competition overrides
such risk.
During the full-scale development phase (Phase
II) it is recommended that a cost-type contract should be
used. The justification offered is that the Government must
have the flexibility to make decisions with regard to tech-
nical uncertainties so as to achieve the best cost-performance
schedule compromises. The expected costs of corrections
brought about by these technical uncertainties are always
fuzzy at the outset of Phase II and, correctly, a portion of
the risk should be borne by the Government.
Once the full development phase is completed,
and the design is firmly established, a fixed-cost type is
in order.
b. Fixed-Price Contract Types
Types of fixed-cost contracts include:
o Firm Fixed Price (FFP) - The buyer agrees to pay a speci-
fied price to the seller when the latter delivers what
was purchased. [53: 117]
o Fixed Price with Escalation (FPE) - A FFP type contract
except an escalation clause provides for either an upward
or downward change in price as a result of changes in
either material prices or labor rates relative to an
economic index. [33: 117]
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o Fixed Price with Redetermination (FPR) - A Contract where
the amounts of labor and material are initially unknown
but can be determined with limited production. A buyer
contracts for a temporary price he believes to be high
but receives protection from still higher prices. After
an agreed-upon percentage of work has been completed at
the temporary price, the contract price is redetermined
based upon data from production to date. The buyer expects
the redetermined price will be lower (perhaps because of
learning or expected future volume). [33: 118]
Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) - The FPI is a variation of
a redeterminable type contract designed to incentivize
production efficiency via a target price, a ceiling price
and variable profit formula. [33: 118]
c. Cost Type Contract Types
A listing of cost-type contracts includes:
o Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) - This type is a variation
of an FPI type contract where buyer and seller agree
beforehand on a tentative fee based on estimated cost.
If the seller can reduce costs below the agreed upon
estimated costs, buyer and seller share the reduction.
Regardless, all costs are paid by the buyer. [53: 121]
o Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) - This type is an offshoot of
a CPIF Contract wherein the fee consists of two parts:
a fixed amount which does not vary with contract perform-
ance, and an award amount intended to be sufficient to
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provide motivation for excellence in contract performance
in areas such as quality, timeliness, ingenuity and cost
effectiveness. [33: 121]
o Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) - A contract type that provides
the seller with reimbursement for all allowable costs up
to a stated amount, plus a fixed fee calculated as a per-
centage of the originally estimated cost. [33: 120]
d. Risk as a Function of Contract Type
By way of summary, Figure 15 depicts the relative





Figure 15. Degree of Risk as a Function of Contract Type
This figure was adapted from the Navv Program Manager's
Guide. [11: 3-37] ' "
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C. INFLATION AND MEASUREMENT OF INFLATION
This section defines and discusses several current theories
of inflation. Next, the development and history of index
numbers are presented along with an example of their use to
determine the base year value of a series of multi-year out-
lays. Lastly, a price level index peculiar to the aerospace
industry is discussed.
1 . Inflation
Inflation is feared by all, criticized by most, and
not clearly understood by any. Samuelson defines inflation
as "...a time of generally rising prices for commodities and
factors of production." [34: 301]
The traditional concept of inflation centered around
the theory of excess total demand. This "Demand-Pull Theory"
states that if the economy is operating at full -employment
then the total output if fixed. Any excess demand will nec-
essarily have the effect of pulling up the price level. The
demand pull theory was widely accepted until the 1957-58
recession, when economists were embarrassed to find that em-
ployment and output were declining at the same time general
price levels were rising. [35: 384] This paradox gave rise
to two newer theories "cost-push inflation" and "structural
inflation." [35: 385]
The cost-push inflation theory maintains that infla-
tionary pressures are a function of unions and businesses.
Unions and businesses both possess significant degrees of
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market power and therefore can manipulate wages and prices
independent of overall total demand. This theory maintains
that the unions are sometimes the villains with their demands
for higher wages pushing up costs which are passed along to
consumer. Other times, businesses are the villains because
they misuse their power to increase prices when the increases
are not justified by increased costs.
Structural inflation theorists believe that inflation
results from a change in the structure, though not the size
of total demand. Briefly stated, this theory maintains that
the market power of businesses (prices) and of unions (wages)
tend to be flexible upward but inflexible downward.
An inflationary theory which currently has a large
following is the "monetarist theory." Monetarists contend
that the quantity of money is the prime determinant of eco-
nomic activity. More specifically, they maintain that this
quantity is controlled by Federal Reserve Board actions.
Aggregate supply depends on factors such as: available inputs
of labor, capital, raw materials, the state of technology,
and crucially on the incentives to put these means to work.
Prices then, the monetarist theorize, depend on the
ratio of money to output. When money grows faster than out-
put, aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply, prices and
interest rates rise and inflation results [36: Editorial Page]
The monetarist view is supported by the historical correla-
tion between changes in the money supply and inflation as
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Figure 16. Inflation and Monetary Growth
Inflation has adversely affected defense acquisitions
throughout history. During the American Revolutionary War
the Continental Congress did not have adequate taxing author-
ity to conduct a major war effort. Consequently, the Congress
financed the Revolution by printing paper money known as
"Continentals." The first issuance was limited to three
million dollars and was to be redeemed in exchange for Spanish
silver dollars after the successful conclusion of the war.
By 1779, however, approximately 200 million dollars of paper
currency had been issued. General George Washington wrote
in that same year, "A wagon load of money will scarcely pur-
chase a wagon load of provisions." [37: 138-142]
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The impact that inflation can have on a modern weapon
system will be addressed in the next subsection.
2 . Index Numbers
The use of index numbers grew from the necessity to
relate the values of real assets from one period to another
during times of inflation. In olden times when the local
king debased the silver coinage by minting coins that were
50% silver and 50% some other metal without any value the
mathematics were simple; it would take two new coins to equal
one old coin.
In today's complex economy things are not as simple.
The modern study of index numbers dates back to 1800 and
draws from both statistics and economics. The formulas and
proofs for weighting methods used today were presented by
Laspeyres (1864) and Paasche (1874). [38: 652-655]
a. Index Numbers and Program Budgets
To see how index numbers are used in analyzing
and managing program budgets, consider a hypothetical series
of Appropriations for Research and Development of the X-99
airplane presented in Table 1. All funds appropriated for
research and development of the X-99 will not be expended
during the year they become New Budget Authority but will be
actually spent (outlaid) over a number of years. A visual
model, Figure 17, may make this more clear.
Assume that the complete appropriated budget au-
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If there were zero inflation in the aerospace
industry in the years 1990 through 1995, the "total then year
dollars" row would accurately reflect the value of resources
expended in each respective year. However, a more realistic
situation assumes the annual rates of inflation shown in
Table 3.
TABLE 3
ASSUMED ANNUAL RATES OF INFLATION
Annual Rates of




1993-- — - --- 8.4
1994 -7.3
199 5 8.0
Now, because of inflation, the 1990 appropriated
dollars did not buy a full 1,500 million dollars worth of
goods, but bought less because the dollars expended in 1991
and 1992 were of less value than they were in 1990. How much
purchasing power was lost? In developing an answer to the
question look first at the number of additional dollars that
would be required to offset inflation each year during the













x ••' x (1+I n }
where $
r
= the number of dollars required in year t
to equal the purchasing power of $ Base
Year Dollars
$ = Base Year Dollars
o
I, , I-...I = Annual inflation rate for each year t
1 L n
Applying the above formula to the example at hand,
1.025 of the 1991 dollars would be required to equal the pur-
chasing power of one 1990 dollar; according to:
S
t V 1 + I 199l)





This is a price level index number. Likewise
1.068 of the 1992 dollars would be required to equal the pur-
chasing power of one 1990 dollar:
$ t " V 1 + I 199l) x ( 1 + I 1992)
$ 1Q92 = 1(1+0.025) x (1+0.042)
5 19g2 = 1.068
A complete listing of price level index numbers




ASSUMED PRICE LEVEL INDEX (PL I) NUMBERS
Hypothetical Price Level Index (PLI)
Number of current (then year) dollars
required to equal the purchasing







The information need to convert from the "then
Year" (current) dollars to an equivalent value of "base year"







PIT" or ecluall y> * t
= K M PLI t
$ = (as before)




PLI = Price Level Factor for the year t (i.e.
the number of current (then year) dollars
required to equal the purchasing power of
one Base Year Dollar)
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Returning to the data presented in Table 2 on outlays, and
applying the methods developed, these data can now be deflated
and expressed in terms of constant dollars; that is, in 1990
Base year dollars.
For example, the $400 million of the 1990 appropri-
ation outlaid in 1992 had a value of $374.53 million in terms




$ 1990 ' $ 1992
PLI 1992
$ 1990
= $ 400 million
= $ 374.53 million
1.068
Inflation ate away (400.00 - 374.53=) $25.47 million.
Reconstructing Table 2 in terms of constant 1990
dollars yields Table 5.
Whereas $4,700 million "then year" dollars were
appropriated for research and development of the X-99 airplane,
this amounted to only $4,423.94 million when expressed in
terms of constant 1990 dollars. There were ($4,700 - $4,423.94=)
$276 million lost because of the multiyear spending pattern
during inflationary times.
In the development above the annual inflation
rate was given and the price level indices were constructed
using the assumed annual inflation rates. In reality the
measurement of the changing purchasing power of money is a
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How would one measure inflation? One way would
be to define a "market basket" of goods and services and cal-
culate the money required to purchase the goods and services
in the market basket. At some later time one could again
purchase a market basket containing identical or similar items,
and by comparing the amount of money paid at those two points
in time have a measure of inflation. This is just what
Laspeyres and Paasche proposed. They differed, however, in
the manner by which they weighted their market baskets,
b. Laspeyres Index
Laspeyres proposed to compare the prices of the
base year's market basket of goods, to the current prices of
that same market basket. [38: 625-635] That is:
I P t %
Y P Q<t- o x o
Where P = the current price of a good in the market
basket
.
P = the base price of a good in the market
basket
Q = the base quantity of that good in the
market basket.
However, there is a problem. The rational con-
sumer will not buy the same market basket of goods and services
when prices are changing relative to each other. He or she
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would adjust the composition of the basket to contain more
of the less expensive items and less of the more expensive
items. Considering the producer of the hypothetical X-99 for
a moment, in times of increasing costs of labor, but stable
or decreasing cost of capital, the manufacturer would shift
production toward a less labor intensive mix. Laspeyres
indices do not consider these dynamics of the market and may
be thought of as a comparison of a hypothetical market basket
( Y P Q ) to an actual market basket ( VP Q ). Consequently,
during periods of generally increasing prices, Laspeyres in-
dices generally are considered to overstate the level of prices
in periods other than the base period. The Consumer Price
Index (CPI) and the Producer Price Index (PPI) are of the
Laspeyres type.
c. Paasche Index
On the other hand, Paasche proposed to compare
market baskets filled with current quantities of goods and
services purchased at base year prices and current prices,
that is: [38: 625-655]
Z p t Qt
Z p Q t
By the same logic as before this is a comparison
of an actual market basket ( J]P t Q t ) to a hypothetical market
basket ( J]p Q ). It follows that during periods of generally
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increasing prices a Paasche index would tend to understate
the level of prices in periods other than the base period.
The Gross National Product Deflator (Index) is of the Paasche
type.
3 . Aerospace Price Indexes
It is generally believed that an index developed
around a specific industry or product type would provide a
better explanation of, and would be a better predictor for,
inflationary price movement within that specific industry or
product than a general, "economy-wide" index such as the PPI.
Campbell (in a 1970 Rand Corporation Study) developed
a methodology for constructing an index specific to the aero-
space industry, which the Department of Defense has generally
embraced [39: 1-22]. Campbell's "market basket" contains aero
space products and he developed his index (Laspeyres type)
using the prices of materials, parts, and the wages of the
aerospace workers that went into producing those products.
The advantage of an index specific to the aerospace
industry can be seen in the following example. Aircraft
engines use a large amount of the metal nickel, and the price
of nickel has greatly increased during the last year. The
cost of aircraft engines reflects this increased metal cost.
Only an index that considers the weighted impact of the cost
increase of nickel (and other specific materials) can accu-
rately reflect the impact of inflation on aerospace products.
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Some caution is well advised, however. An index
specific to the aerospace industry at large may not be rep-
resentative of the "market basket" of materials, parts and
labor required to produce a particular airplane. Additionally,
Padgett, in his 1975 study, challenged the effectiveness of
aerospace indexes because most use wholesale price index data
weighted only for materials and labor [31: 103-107]. He
points out that, "the WPI (now called the PPI) does not reflect
the full effects of inflation in that no allowance is made
for discounts, credit terms, interest rates, capital cost and
changing overhead rates due to changes in the level of business
that may accompany a rising rate of inflation."
D. CHAPTER II SUMMARY
The intent of this chapter was to survey pertinent liter-
ature in support of the research which will be reported in
Chapter Three. Additionally, an attempt was made to collect
and summarize this multi-disciplinary literature into a form
convenient for reference by program managers.
The first section of this chapter addressed the program
management and acquisition environment. The program manage-
ment concept was described as the central organizational
mechanism for integrating research, development, test and
evaluation efforts. The central tenet of program management
was seen to be organization by purpose. The acquisition en-
vironment was discussed in terms of the Defense Systems Acqui-
sition Review Council (DSARC) and the Planning, Programming,
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Budgeting System (PPBS) . The DSARC was observed to be a
"technical event oriented" control system which does not pro-
vide acquisition funding. PPBS was seen to be a "periodic" or
"time" oriented system which does provide acquisition funding.
It was noted that funding delays could be experienced if DSARC
milestones were completed out of phase with the PPBS. The
Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) was regarded as the standard,
comprehensive summary status report on major defense acquisi-
tion programs
.
The second section of this chapter covered program
management methods, concepts and techniques in acquisition
programs. First cited were program cost estimation methods.
Parametric and industrial engineering methods were addressed,
as were sources of estimating errors. A case was made for
communicating cost estimates as "confidence intervals" versus
"point" estimates so as to relate uncertainties encountered
in estimate formulation. Next the theory of learning curves
was presented as a method utilized in estimating the cost of
units produced as a function of production experience. Gen-
erally, this theory holds that as the quantity of units produced
doubles, the cost per unit decreases by some constant percent-
age. Then, engineering changes were noted to usually lead to
increased program cost. Causes of engineering changes dis-
cussed included: (a) bringing system performance up to expected
standards, (b) incorporation of advances in the state of the
art, (c) concurrency, (d) striving for technical perfection,
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and (e) buy-ins. An economic defense of cost-benefit analysis
was offered when discussing the cost of buying improved per-
formance. Lastly, different types of contracts were explored
as a technique for program cost control. Different contracts
were visualized on a continuum from fixed-price-type contracts
(where the producer assumes the majority of the risk) to cost-
type contracts (where the government assumes the majority of
the risk) .
The third and final section of this chapter concerned
inflation and measurements of inflation. Inflation was defined
as a time of generally rising prices. Inflation theories dis-
cussed were the demand-pull, cost-push, structural, and mone-
tarist theories. The monetarist theory was viewed as being
currently widely accepted; this theory maintains that the
quantity of the money supply is the prime determinant of in-
flation. The measurement of inflation was discussed in the
context of index numbers. Both LasPeyres and Paasche type
indexes were defined. Finally, some caution was advised in
use of indexes developed specifically for the aerospace indus-
try because most do not reflect the full effects of inflation.
79

III. ANALYSIS OF F/A-18 PROGRAM COST GROWTH
The analysis of weapons systems cost growth is complex
and requires a knowledge of the program management environ-
ment, the methods, concepts and techniques of cost estimation
and control, and an understanding of inflation and measure-
ments of inflation. Much of this needed background is provided
in the previous chapter.
This chapter analyzes the cost growth experienced in the
F/A-18 airplane acquisition program. The following questions
are addressed in the subsequent material:
o What is the magnitude of total F/A-18 program cost growth?
o What elements make up the F/A-18 acquisition?
o What accounting control system is utilized to track
program cost growth, and how is the system categorized?
o What quantitative effect does failure to recognize actual
inflation have on cost growth?
o How much control does the program manager have over cost
growth?
o What are possible areas of future F/A-18 program cost
growth?
Unless otherwise noted, the source for all data presented in
this chapter was the F/A-18 program Selected Acquisition
Reports
.
Before proceeding, the reader must recall that the latest
data utilized in this analysis is as of December 1980. This
information cut-off was established because this is the latest
80

data available which was required to be in agreement with the
President's budget submission. This is important because in-
formation relating to major changes and large cost growths
may not be highlighted until the budget is submitted in request
for annual appropriations.
The reader must also realize that it is very early in the
F/A-18 acquisition. Only approximately 20 percent of the
estimated total program funding base year dollars have been
expended. Critics may correctly charge that there is too much
uncertainty regarding future military decisions and economic
conditions to produce a high confidence estimate of total
program cost. However, not unlike an individual trying to
decide which house to purchase, the Department of Defense must
make assumptions regarding future expectations in order to be
able to select among competing alternatives for limited re-
sources. To do otherwise is to stick one's head in the sand.
A. TOTAL PROGRAM COST ESTIMATE
1. Then Year Dollars
A historical tracing of the F/A-18 airplane total
program cost estimates, expressed in then year dollars, is
depicted in Figure 18.
The total program cost estimate includes all program
acquisition costs applicable to the approved program regard-
less of the program's stage of development.
The approved program is the set of operational, technical,
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Figure 18. F/A-18 Total Program Cost Estimates
Then Year Dollars
Depicted on the left of Figure 18 is the $12.9 billion
development estimate approved at the F/A-18 DSARC II Review
of 2 December 1975. This development estimate was published
in the March 1976 Selected Acquisition Report and serves as
the program base line from which all cost variance is measured
This then year figure is the sum of all the annual appropri-
ations required for the program and reflects assumptions made
Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum, or Program Decision
Memorandum reflecting a more current decision of the Secre-




by the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding the ex-
pected inflation rates throughout the life of the acquisition
program. The other data points shown on Figure 18 are the
current estimates of the total program cost, also in the then
year dollars, as they were reported by the program manager in
each December Selected Acquisition Report for years 1976
through 1980. The amount by which the current estimate
exceeds the development estimate reflects the cost of program
matic and technical changes, the impact of inflation on those
changes, and changes in inflation expectations for future
years
.
The then year dollar, total program cost, current
estimate is the figure most often reported in the popular
media. These data are quoted by program opponents and con-
gressional detractors. Looking at these data does appear to
show an alarming cost growth for the F/A-18 program. The
total program cost estimate, which was initially less than
$13 billion, has grown to almost $38 billion dollars in just
over four years. This may be even more disquieting when one
realizes that the F/A-18 is still early in its program life
2A Selected Acquisition Report is published each calendar
quarter, but the December SAR's are required to be in agree-
ment with the President's budget submission and supporting
documentation, including the FYDP . This requirement means
that the December Selected Acquisition Report is the best
source of program cost data. Major changes and large cost
growths are recognized in the December SAR more so than in
SAR's for other quarters.

3
cycle; and typically cost estimates grow as a program
matures .
2 . Base Year Dollars
However, since the then year dollar estimates of
F/A-18 total program cost contain the effects of inflation,
the question quickly arises: What is the total program cost
estimate in constant or base year dollars? Stated another
way, what is the estimated total cost of the program assum-
ing the purchasing power of the dollar existing in 1975 (when
the development estimate was prepared) remained constant
throughout the life of the program? To answer this question
the data previously reported in Figure 18 are deflated using
as index constructed from the Office of the Secretary of
4
Defense projections for inflation. These F/A-18 airplane
total program cost estimates, in base year (1975) dollars,
are presented in Figure 19. The then year data are reproduced
for reference.
The development estimate of total program cost in
base year dollars was $8.0 billion. By 1980 the current
estimate of total program cost had grown to $15.8 billion
As of December 1980, only approximately 5.5 billion
then year dollars have been actually spent or obligated
for the F/A-18.
4
This process is actually carried out in reverse. That
is, one starts with base year dollar estimates and inflates
to the year dollars. However, since the reliability of OSD
rates will later be questioned, the analysis is presented as
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Figure 19. F/A-18 Total Program Cost Estimates Then
Year and Base Year (1975) Dollars
base year dollars. Clearly, by comparing the current estimates
of then year data and base year data, the reader can observe
that much of the cost growth discussed in the popular media
is a product of inflation. This is true even when the then
year data are deflated using inflation indexes derived from
inflation estimates issued by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. (These rates are underestimated as will be discussed
later in the chapter)
.
An enlightening way to look at these same data is pre-
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Figure 20. F/A-18 Total Program Cost - A Percentage
Analysis of Then Year Cost Estimates
It may be noted that when the development estimate
was prepared ($12.9 billion in then year dollars), approxi-
mately 38 percent of this total then year dollar estimate
represented escalation (the Department of Defense word for
inflation) and 62 percent represented the total program cost
in 1975 dollars. However, by the end of 1980 escalation
5$12.9 billion - then year dollar estimate of total program cost
8.0 billion - base year dollar estimate of total program cost
S 4.9 escalation





amounted to over 58 percent of the then year dollar, current
estimate of total program cost. This reflects that while the
total program cost was growing in terms of both the base year
dollar estimate and in terms of the impact of inflation, the
inflationary effects and expectations were growing faster and
were constituting a larger and larger percentage of total
program cost.
3 . Base Year Dollars - -Adjusted for Inventory Objective
Deflating the then year, current estimates of total
program cost to base year dollars removes one variable (infla-
tion) and makes easier the analysis of the program cost growth.
However, there is another variable which clouds a comparison
of the development estimate and current estimates reported
after December 1978. The development estimate addressed an
800 airplane force, whereas the large cost growth observed
in 1978 reflects a quantity change in the program inventory
objective to 1366 airplanes.
A case can be made that the inventory objectives (800
airplanes) stated in the development estimate were understated.
This will be addressed in the later section on Quantity Vari-
ance. However, to facilitate an analysis of the management
of the program relative to the development estimate, the cost
associated with the additional 566 airplanes (1366 - 800 =
566) is removed. The results are depicted in Figure 21. The
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Figure 21. F/A-18 Total Program Cost Estimates Then Year
Dollars and Base Year Dollars and Base Year
Dollars Adjusted to a Constant 800 Airplane
Force
As depicted in Figure 21, the development estimate
of total program cost for 800 airplanes is, as previously
noted, approximately 8.0 billion base year dollars. When
adjusted to an 800 airplane basis, the 1980 current estimate
of total program cost is approximately 10.6 billion 1975
dollars. While still significant, these figures do not
This adjustment was made by reducing the 1566 airplane
data by subtracting the cost of production airplanes 801
through 1366 based on the development cos t -quantity curves
and also reducing the support cost associated solely with
the additional 566 airplanes. The cost -quantity relation-
ships and the support cost will later be addressed in detail
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generate the alarm felt when observing the total program cost
estimates in terms of then year dollars.
4. Magnitude of F/A-18 Cost Growth
The relative magnitude of F/A-18 cost growth may be
better analyzed by developing a ratio of the current estimate
of total program cost to the development estimate of total
program cost. This ratio is presented in Figure 22 for esti-
mates expressed in then year dollars, base year dollars, and














Figure 22. The Ratio of F/A-18 Current Estimates of
Total Program Cost to the Development
Estimate of Program Cost
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As of December 1980 the F/A-18 program cost growth
was estimated to be almost 200 percent in terms of then year
dollars; almost 100 percent in terms of base year dollars;
and just over 32 percent in terms of base year dollars adjust-
ed to consider a constant number (800) of airplanes. (Follow-
ing a later analysis of the true effects of inflation the
magnitude of cost growth will be shown to be actually less
than 32 percent)
.
The "alarming cost growth" expostulated by program
critics loses some of its sting when the figures are corrected
to make a fair comparison between the development and current
estimates .
B. A BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL PROGRAM ACQUISITION COST
So far total program cost has been discussed only in the
aggregate without looking at the elements that make up the
F/A-18 acquisition. (Program cost and program acquisition
cost are synonymous terms
.
)




o Military Construction Cost
1
. Development Cost
The development cost includes all research, engineer-
ing, test and evaluation costs incurred from the point the
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program is designated by title. These costs include those
expended during the DSARC conceptual exploration phase (Phase
0) , the demonstration and validation phase (Phase I), and the
full-scale development phase (Phase II).
The historical tracing of the estimate of F/A-18
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Figure 23. F/A-18 Development Cost Estimates
In the estimate of program cost produced at the time
the Secretary of Defense approved full-scale development
(DSARC Milestone II), it was estimated that the F/A-18 could
be developed for 1.4 billion 1975 dollars. By 1980 this
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estimate of cost for development had risen 15.6 percent to
1.6 billion 1975 dollars. Unlike the estimate of procurement
cost, most of which will be outlaid well into the future, the
F/A-18 development is presently well on its way to completion.
Therefore, the current estimate of development cost should be
relatively accurately known. (The development cost is inde-
pendent of the F/A-18 inventory objectives.)
2 . Procurement Cost
The procurement cost may be further broken down into
flyaway cost, support cost and initial spares.
Flyaway cost is a generic term related to the creation
of a usable end item. For the F/A-18 the flyaway cost includes
the airframe, engine, accessories, electronics, communication
equipment, armament, government furnished equipment and the
cost of changes made to the above.
Support cost includes installation support, depot
maintenance; supply management, second destination transpor-
tation, personnel support and training.
The initial spares category includes those initial
spare components, assemblies, and initial repair parts used
for replacement purposes in the flyaway airplane until the
regular supply pipelines are operative.
The historical tracing for the estimate of all F/A-18
procurement cost is shown in Figure 24.
The development estimate of all procurement cost
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Figure 24. F/A-18 Procurement Cost Estimates
estimate was 14.1 billion 1975 dollars. The large increase
in 1978 procurement cost is largely caused by the increased
cost associated with the decision to buy 1366 airplanes in-
stead of 800 airplanes.
3 . Military Construction Cost
The military construction cost includes the construc-
tion of training facilities peculiar to the weapon system
being acquired. The military construction cost for the F/A-18
program represents a relatively small proportion of total
program cost and provides for facilities for Navy and Marine
air crew and maintenance personnel training. The Navy
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facilities are planned for Naval Air Stations Lemoore, Cali-
fornia, and Cecil Field, Florida. The Marine facilities are
to be constructed at Marine Corps Air Stations El Toro, Cali-
fornia, and Yuma, Arizona.
The development estimate of F/A-18 military construc-
tion cost was 18 million 1975 dollars, and the December 1980
current estimate was 30.8 million 1975 dollars. The historical
tracing of program military construction cost estimate is pro-
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Figure 25. F/A-18 Military Construction Cost Estimates
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According to the Selected Acquisition Reports, the
increased estimate of military construction cost in 1979 and
1980 reflects, "a revision of earlier estimates based on new
engineering studies and a revised base loading plan." No
further amplification was provided in the Selected Acquisition
Reports, but a program office official stated that, "You can
translate that to say that they (government civil engineers)
found they could not get the facilities constructed for the
amount estimated back in 1975."
4 . Percentage Analysis (Breakdown) of Total Program Cost
Estimates
Figure 26 shows the total program cost estimates broken
down into development, procurement (flyaway, support, initial
spares), and military construction costs.
By far, the procurement cost constitutes the largest
proportion of total program cost. Over 80 percent for the
planned 800 airplane buy to just under 90 percent for the
planned 1366 airplane inventory objective is due to procure-
ment cost. Development costs, which were recognized earlier
to be independent of the inventory objective, represent a
smaller percentage of total program cost as the buy increases.
A compression of support cost percentages is identi-
fiable in Figure 26. Interviewees at the Naval Air Systems
Command related that this compression has two probable causes:
1) Increased economies of scale and 2) "perhaps", some short-
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Figure 26 F/A-18 Total Program Cost Estimates
Percentage Analysis
program cost growth. The analysis of cost variance which
follows will provide additional insight into support cost.
C. COST VARIANCE ANALYSIS
1 . General
There is always a need to maintain an accounting con-
trol system that emphasizes the differences between actual
cost or updated estimates of actual cost, and the original
estimate of cost. In the Selected Acquisition Reports this
is accomplished via cost variance categories. Cost variance
is defined as the difference between the baseline (development









The following is a discussion of these categories in more
detail
.
2 . Economic Variance
The Selected Acquisition Report guidance defines eco-
nomic variance as the category which reflects changes that are
due solely to the operation of the economy. Perhaps a better
definition would include the comment that this category re-
flects the Office of the Secretary of Defense view of the
economy. This is true because, by definition, an economic
change is recognized only when the escalation indices provided
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense differ from those
previously provided regarding future escalation,
a. Generic Example of Economic Variance
An example may make this clearer. Assume a pro-
gram manager planned to outlay the equivalent of 100,000 base
year dollars each year for five years, and that the price level
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Now, assume at the end of the year two, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense changes the estimate of inflation
and issues the new index numbers, for years three, four and
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The difference between the original then year
program cost estimate ($548,000) and the current estimate of
the then year program cost ($577,000) would be assigned to
economic variance ($577,000 - $548,000 = $29,000).
Note that no adjustment was made for possible
errors in previous years indexes. Even if it were known from
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actual experience that the index for year two, the year just
past, should have been 1.11, it is not recognized in the cal
culation of economic variance. 7 The result of this failure








Since year two outlays were held to 103,000 then year dollars;
in effect, the program did not outlay the equivalent of 100,000
base year dollars but outlaid only the equivalent of 92,800
base year dollars during year two. Consequently, less real
asset value was purchased in year two than was planned,
b. F/A-18 Economic Variance
Not unlike the above example, the F/A-18 program
cost variance has been reported in the Selected Acquisition
Reports without recognition of, or correction for, actual
inflation experienced in the years prior to each report. The
F/A-18 program economic variance does reflect continued annual
DOD INSTRUCTION 7000.36 makes provisions for corrections
to Selected Acquisition Report data for "actual escalation in
prior years," provided approval is granted by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller. However, this researcher
found that most Naval Air Systems Command program offices in
general and F/A-18 Program Office in particular, were unfamil-
iar with this provision. The Office of Secretary of Defense




upward adjustment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
estimate of future inflation. As may be seen in Figure 27,
the F/A-18 program suffered a positive economic variance (an
increase in cost) every year since the formulation of the
development estimate. Since the vast majority of F/A-18
outlays lie in the future (out to 1989) , and because of the
compounding effect of inflation, increases in estimates of
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Figure 27 F/A-18 Economic Variance
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Particularly, note the $3816.1 million dollar
increase in economic variance reported for 1979. The economic
conditions prevailing during 1979 caused the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to markedly increase the estimate of in-
flationary impact during the eighties.
5. Quantity Variance
Quantity variance is defined as a change in the esti-
mated quantity of airplanes to be produced. The cost of the
quantity change is based on the original cost-quantity curve
derived for the development estimate. The F/A-18 development
estimate cost-quality curve is presented in Figure 28.
1000
QUANTITY (Qj)




These data represented in Figure 28 do not plot as
a straight line (on log-log paper) as did the theoretical
3
learning curve discussed in Chapter two. However, this curve
does depict the decreasing unit cost associated with subse-
quent units of production.
The Navy was able to take advantage of this cost sav-
ings when the decision was made in 1978 to increase the F/A-18
inventory objective from 800 airplanes to 1366 airplanes.
This decision was made because the original inventory objec-
tive (800 airplanes) was inadequate to fulfill fleet require-
ments. This was discussed in a 1978 Naval Audit Report that
stated that the original 800 airplane inventory objective
comprised only the aircraft needed to equip planned Navy and
Marine Corps fighter and attack squadrons, and that it did
not include aircraft that will be needed to replace losses
through attrition; neither did it address the Navy reserve
and reconnaissance aircraft requirements or the Marine light
9
attack requirements that may have to be met by the F/A-18.
[41: a-1]
gThis is true because, among other things, contractor
overhead and other fixed costs are included in the flyaway
cost
.
9The inventory objectives shown in the DSARC Decision
Coordinating Paper No. 141 calls for achieving fleet force
levels in 1989 and maintaining those levels for 10 years.
As discussed in the December 1978 Selected Acquisition Report,
the 800 airplane inventory objective did not include the
estimated 146 additional airplanes required to sustain the
desired force after 1989. Additionally, the 800 airplane plan
10;

The estimated 3.079 billion 1975 dollars required to
acquire these 566 airplanes is shown in the historical tracing
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Figure 29. F/A-18 Quantity Variance
These 566 airplanes will be less expensive because
they are to be produced "further down" the learning curve.
However, this increased buy greatly increases the estimate
of total program cost.
did not include the estimated 98 airplanes that may be required
to fulfill a tactical reconnaissance role, nor the 322 air-
planes that will be required to fulfill the USMC light attack
mission. (800 + 146 + 98 + 322 = 1366).
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4 . Schedule Variance
Schedule variance reflects changes in procurement or
delivery schedules, completion date or intermediate milestones
for development or production.
The schedule variance history for the F/A-18 program












Figure 30. F/A-18 Schedule Variance
In terms of base year dollars, production start-up
delays (for example, those due to delays in flight test com-
pletion) or slowing production rates, (due to insufficient
funding) yields relatively small cost growth. This growth
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results from incurring more fixed cost (overhead) during the
longer production and from decreased efficiencies.
However, while the cost growth in terms of base year
dollars may be relatively small, the cost growth associated
with schedule variance in then year dollars can be more sig-
nificant. This is because delaying the start of production
or slowing production rates moves outlays further into future
years and the effects of inflation are suffered over a longer
period. Whereas the schedule variance as of 1980 was only
209 million base year dollars, this is equivalent to over 1
billion then year dollars.
5 . Engineering Variance
Any alteration in the physical or functional charac-
teristics of a system to be delivered or under development
after establishment of such characteristics is defined as
engineering variance. As was discussed in Chapter two, engi-
neering changes are made to bring the performance of a system
up to expected standards, to incorporate advances in the state
of the art, and to strive for technical perfection.
One might expect engineering variance to appear large-
ly during the prototype preparation for first flight and
following the deficiency identification accomplished during
the early flight test and evaluation. This seems to have
been the case with the F/A-18. The first test flight was in
November of 1978. The historical tracing of F/A-18 engineer-
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Figure 31. F/A-18 Engineering Variance
Engineering changes identified during development are
built into production airplanes throughout the production
years. Consequently, the cost in terms of then year dollars
will be much higher than the cost in terms of base year dol-
lars. For example, the 160 million 1975 dollar engineering
variance figure shown on Figure 31 (December 1980) would be
381 million if expressed in then year dollars.
6 . Estimating Variance
The Selected Acquisition Report instructions define
estimating variance as: "a change in program cost due to a
correction of error in preparing the development estimage."
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Figure 32. F/A-18 Estimating Variance
By December 1980, this estimating variance amounted to 5.4
billion 1975 dollars. However, the definition of estimating
variance is misleading since "errors" in the development es-
timate may be real or may represent political maneuvering.
Also, the failure to recognize all inflation as economic
variance will cause cost growth due to unrecognized inflation




a. Political Impact on Development Estimates
A former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, interviewed by this researcher,
discussed the political problem of "correctly" producing a
development estimate of weapon systems cost. The Deputy Under
Secretary related that, "The Washington political environment
forces (F/A-18 and other) program managers to produce cost
estimates that are on the margin between the plausible and
the implausible." This official's amplifying remarks can be
summarized by defining a continuum formed by cost estimation
extremes. Located on the lower cost extremity would be an
estimate which is unrealistically low but politically attrac-
tive. This estimate might serve as a "foot in the door"
strategy. But, as the program matures, large cost growth
would become evident. At the other extreme would be an esti-
mate that is sufficiently large to cover all program cost,
with high probability, even allowing for "bad luck." The
problem here is that, while the program would not suffer from
cost growth, the original estimate may be so large that deci-
sion makers might well deem it more economically attractive
to reject the program and seek alternative means of fulfilling
the same requirement. This would be especially true if the
decision makers have historically become accustomed to expect-
ing a program to cost more than the initial estimates. "There
is unfortunately more to cost estimating than looking to see




b. Cost Growth Due to Unrecognized Inflation
As previously intimated, cost growth resulting
from low development estimates is not the only cause of esti-
mating variance. Also included in estimating variance, but
not identified or discussed in the Selected Acquisition Report
instructions, is inflationary cost growth over and above that
inflation recognized in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
estimates of inflation. Airplane procurement contracts are
written annually and contractors are paid in current dollars.
If the price level index produced from the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense inflation assumptions is lower than actual
inflationary experience, the result is that less asset value
(in terms of base year dollars) is procured than indicated
by calculations using the Office of the Secretary of Defense
indexes. A numerical example of this was offered in the ear-
lier section (2) on escalation variance. Faced with this
dilemma, a program manager must either buy less program or
suffer cost growth by providing the extra current dollars
required to produce the required asset value. If the latter
course of action is pursued, this cost growth will show up
as estimating variance.
Consider the December 1980 F/A-18 Selected Acqui-
sition Report which contains the following quote:
The Office of Secretary of Defense escalation adjustments
have not been in line with actual industry experience and
have created budget shortfall that has to be absorbed into
the base estimate. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
policy has been to adjust the economic escalation factors
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for subsequent procurements for inaccurate estimates but
with no allowance for recovery of prior year escalation
where the rates projected were less than actual industry
experience. This means that the base years estimate of
the program, which is expressed in fiscal year 1975 dollars
includes a certain amount of absorbed escalation.
The following analysis will quantitatively identify estimating
variance which is really unrecognized inflation (absorbed
escalation) from past years.
(1) Office of the Secretary of Defense Estimates
of Inflation . Each Selected Acquisition Report contains the
latest Office of the Secretary of Defense estimate of annual
escalation rates applicable to the budget year and each sub-
sequent year of the program being reported. These inflation
estimates are provided for development cost, procurement
cost, and military construction cost. The evolution of these
estimates may be viewed in Appendix C. These numbers were
extracted from the first F/A-18 Selected Acquisition Report
(March, 1976) and from each subsequent December report.
These Office of the Secretary of Defense
estimates of inflation for past years should be viewed rela-
tive to inflation measured by the broad, Gross National Product
(GNP) deflator, the more familiar Consumer Price Index (CPI),
and the "actual" industrial experience. These measures of
inflation and the Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates
of inflation are presented in Table 8 for years 1976 through
1980. 10
To simplify the presentation, the transition quarter




COMPARISON OF INFLATION RATES
Year: 19XX
76 7 7/ / 7 8 79 80
GNP
Deflator 5.2 5.8 7.3 8.5 9.0







Dev. 8.7 8.2 8.9 11.5 11.5
Pro. 10.1 8.3 9.0 11.5 12.8






Dev. 9.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.5
Pro. 9.0 9.0 7.0 6.0 6.2
Milcon. 9.0 7.0 5.0 7.0 7.0
Generally, the inflation estimates issued by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for development, pro-
curement and military construction cost were lower than the
GNP deflator, CPI and "actual" inflation measures. The
"actual" data relating inflationary experience of the aero-
space industry were the highest of all.
calendar years and the OSD and "actual" data reflect fiscal
years has been disregarded. The OSD estimates are the histor-
ical estimates of inflation used in the computation of the
current (Dec. 1980) estimate of program cost. They are repro-
duced from Appendix C.
Some of the Office of the Secretary of Defense inflation
estimates were higher than GNP deflator and CPI in 1976 and
1977. However, relatively few F/A-18 program funds were out-
laid in those years.
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These "actual" measures were constructed by
the Naval Air Systems Command in conjunction with the Naval
Material Command, using the Data Resources, Inc. Econometric
Data Base. All high level and working level government pro-
curement personnel interviewed conscientiously expressed the
belief that these "actual" data represented the best availa-
ble measures of F/A-18 program inflationary experience. For
the analysis that follows the assumption is made that their
expert opinion is correct.
(2) Recognition of Unrecognized Inflation . Having
assumed that the "actual" inflation data are correct, the in-
tent now is to adjust the estimates of F/A-18 program cost
reported in the December 1980 Selected Acquisition Report for
the difference between the Office of the Secretary of Defense-
issued estimates of inflation and these "actual" measurements
of inflation.
This is accomplished by identifying the string
of then year outlays (historical and current estimate of future
12
cash flows) for the F/A-18 program.
Then, these cash flows are deflated using a
price level index made up of the "actual" inflationary data
for past years and the December 1980 Office of the Secretary
12These cash flows are not published in the SAR's but
are the basis for SAR cost estimates. They were provided by
for the program office and are presented in Appendix D.
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of Defense, estimates of future escalation. The worksheets
and a detailed, step-by-step description of methodology for
these calculations is presented in Appendix D. The results


















Development 1,661.6 1,524.0 137.6
Procurement 14,065.6 12,403.2 1,662.4
Military
Construction 30.8 27.8 5.0
Total Program
Cost 15,758.0 13,955.0 1,803.0
The cost growth due unrecognized inflation, figure represents
the difference between the December 1980 Selected Acquisition
Report, current estimate, (1975 dollars) and this same esti-
mate recalculated using the "actual" measures of inflation
for past years
.
This analysis indicates that the estimate of
total program cost reported in the December 1980 Selected
Acquisition Report is 11 percent or 1.8 billion 1975 dollars
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in excess of the actual base year cost. Likewise, the eco-
nomic variance reported understates the "actual" impact of
economic change on the program by 1.8 billion 1975 dollars,
and the estimating variance (the catch-all category) is over-
stated by 1.8 billion 1975 dollars.
7 . Support Variance
Any change in cost associated with elements not
included in flyaway cost is reported as support variance.
Herein included are cost changes (relative to the development
estimate) associated with training and training equipment,
peculiar support equipment, operational or site activation,
initial spares and repair parts, and changes in construction
requirements. The support variance history of the F/A-18
program is depicted in Figure 33.
Note that the support variance is the only category
which has ever decreased in magnitude after having gone posi-
tive (1979) . Naval Air Systems Command and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense interviewees indicated (in general,
not specifically addressing the F/A-18) that this may be
because support cost possesses some "pseudo-management reserve
character." In other words, they suggested that the program
manager has some ability to buy less support than that actu-
ally required. This would allow support variance and hence
total program cost to be reported as lower than that required
to fulfill the spirit of the development estimate.
The F-14 and the S-3 were Navy programs mentioned as







Figure 33. F/A-18 Support Variance
Also, the support category provides some flexibility
in leveling the rate of cost growth. Interviewees pointed
out that the estimated amount of support cost can be arti-
ficially reported as lowered during a period of high cost
growth and corrected later.
8 . Variance Computation
Before comparing the relative magnitude of the vari-
ance categories, two details need to be addressed. The first
has to do with the order of variance computation and the
other concerns the escalation associated with program change.
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a. Order of Computation
The order in which variance categories are cal-
culated can determine the magnitude of change assigned to a
particular category. Consider a hypothetical program in
which 20 units are to be procured at $10 each. The total
cost will be:
20 units x £i2v = $200.
unit
If the unit cost increases from $10 to S15 for
reasons not assigned to other categories, the increase would
be attributed to estimating variance. If, because of this
increased cost, the decision was made to acquire five fewer
units, this would be a change in quantity variance.
If the estimating variance is computed first the
amount would be:
Estimating variance = (20 units x — ) - (20 units x ^Hj = $ +100.
unit unit
And, then the quantity variance would be:
'Quantity Variance = $15 units x $if- ) - (20 units x ^- ) = $ - $75
units' v units
The net program cost change would be ($ + 100) + ($ -75) = S +25,
However, if the quantity variance is computed
before the estimating variance the amount would be:




And, then the estimating variance amount is calculated:
$15 SlO
Estimating Variance = ($15 units x -
—
- ) - (15 units x £__. ) = $ +75.
unit unit
Here also the net program cost change would be $ +25, but the
amounts assigned to estimating and quantity variance differ.
Recognizing the requirement for consistency, DOD
Instruction 7000.3 mandates the following computational order:
Economic Variances are computed first since they are due
solely to operation of the economy.
Quantity Variances are calculated next because current
period engineering and estimating changes may change
the cost-quantity curve assumptions.
Schedule Variances are next because this completes the
defined scope of the current program.
Engineering, and Estimating Variances are computed next
(in that order) purely in the name of consistency.
Support Variances are computed last because some support
items are estimated as a function of flyaway cost.
b. Program Change-Related Escalation
Program change escalation is the difference between
the then year and the base year dollar cost estimates for each
change contributing to a variance category at the time a
14
change is made . Once a program change-related escalation
14
The program change- related escalation for the F/A-18
program may be viewed by looking back at the historical
tracing for quantity (Figure 28), schedule (Figure 30), esti-
mating (Figure 32) and support (Figure 53) variances. The
vertical distance between the base year dollar curve and the
then year dollar curve at each data point represents the pro-
gram change- related escalation as it was reported in the
December Selected Acquisition Reports. From the viewpoint of
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estimate is added to the base year estimated cost of a change,
future changes resulting from revision of indices will be
reflected in the economic change category, even though such
changes may impact upon a previously calculated program change'
related escalation.
Consider an example: Assume a deficiency is iden-
tified during flight test that requires an engineering change.
Further assume that the cost of the engineering change adds
1,000 base year dollars to the cost of each airplane. The
contribution to the engineering variance, in terms of base
year dollars, would be $1,000 times the number of airplanes
to be produced. The contribution to the engineering variance,
in terms of then year dollars, requires that the series of
1000 base year dollar, cash flows be inflated by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense escalation index in existence when
the change is made. The next year, if the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense escalation index changes, the adjustment
to the then year dollar cost of this engineering change would
affect only the economic variance category. This is done to
simplify the Selected Acquisition Report computational
requirements
.
controlling cost, program change-related escalation is very
important. While it is unrealistic to expect to manage a
major weapon system acquisition without making changes, pro
gram managers must realize that the cost of those changes
will be magnified by inflation.
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D. MAGNITUDE OF F/A-18 COST GROWTH CONSIDERING "ACTUAL"
INFLATION
Earlier in this chapter it was related that the F/A-18
cost growth was 32 percent in terms of base year dollars ad-
justed for the quantity increase. However, the base year
dollar figure which was adjusted was that published in the
December 1980 Selected Acquisition Report. As was noted in
the previous section on estimating variance, the base year
dollar, estimate reported in the Selected Acquisition Reports
contains cost growth due to unrecognized inflation. The
analyses of the magnitude of F/A-18 cost growth may now be
refined so as to adjust this base year dollar estimate for
both the quantity variance and for the 1.8 billion 1975 dollar
cost growth due to unrecognized inflation. The result is
that the F/A-18 program cost growth, as of December 1980,
was only 10.0 percent when both the quantity change and "actual"
inflationary experience are considered.
E. COST GROWTH- -PROGRAM MANAGER CONTROL
In the previous sections cost variance categories were
examined in some detail. This has laid the groundwork for
examining the relative contribution of individual variance
categories to total program cost growth. This relative com-
parison will then support identification of cost growth factors
which can and cannot be controlled by program managers.
The December 1980 Selected Acquisition Report presents
the latest cost variance data produced in concert with a
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Presidential budget. The relative magnitude of these F/A-18


















SU ES EN SC QT EC
Figure 54. Relative Magnitude of F/A-18 Cost Variance
Categories
1 . Economic Variance
Economic variance as reported in the December 1980
Selected Acquisition Report, constituted 24.2 percent of
total F/A-18 cost growth. This represents the increased pro-
gram cost associated solely with the operation of the economy
as estimated by inflation indices issued by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. Practically speaking, the program
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manager had no control over the operation of the economy,




Quantity variance made up 27.5 percent of total pro-
gram cost growth and represented the cost associated with
increasing the F/A-18 inventory objective from 800 airplanes
to 1366 airplanes. Inventory objective decisions were made
by requirements analysis and managers within the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations. The Naval Air Systems Command
Program Manager had no control over the inventory objectives.
3 Schedule Variance
Schedule variance represented 4.2 percent of total
F/A-18 program cost growth. This variance resulted from
changes to the procurement schedule envisioned in the Develop-
ment Estimate. Slow progress of the F/A-18 test and evaluation
forced a change in the planned production build-up rate, and
the program manager is responsible for control over the pro-
gress of development testing.
However, a former Systems Commander pointed out that
more generally, schedule variance was a product of the PPBS
process. As the Navy and the nation attempt to share scarce
dollar resources among competing requirements, a program may
fair better some years than others. If the Congress appro-
priates fewer funds than are requested in the Navy's Program





Objectives Memorandum and requirements have not changed, then
the option is to stretch out the delivery schedule. The pro-
gram manager cannot be held responsible for schedule variance




Engineering variance accounted for 1.5 percent of
total program cost growth. Since this category represents
the cost of changes in the physical or functional character-
istic of a system, a program manager would be expected to
have exercised control over these engineering changes.
5 Estimating Variance
Estimating variance constituted the largest category
at 34.2 percent of total program cost growth. This category,
by definition, reflects changes in program cost due to correc-
tion of errors in preparing the development estimate. However,
as discussed previously, if the inflation estimated by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense is less than that actually
experienced during previous years, estimating variance will
also reflect increased cost due to unrecognized inflation.
This research effort found that 1.805 billion 1975 dollars
of cost growth was reported as estimating variance because
of cost growth due to unrecognized inflation. This repre-
sented 53.5 percent of the reported estimating variance and
(53.5 x 54.2 =) 18.3 percent of total program cost growth.
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Just as with economic variance, the program manager had no
control over cost growth due to unrecognized inflation.
The remaining 46.5 percent of the reported estimating
variance represented (46.5 x 34.2 =) 15.9 percent of total
program cost growth. This indicates that the development
estimate was lower than experience to date indicates it should
have been. This cost growth, due to overly optimistic cost
estimating, was controllable, but controllable only by the
program manager in command when the development estimate was
prepared. Political constraints may have rendered it large-
ly uncontrollable, in effect; and subsequent program managers
were left to suffer the consequences.
6 . Support Variance
Support variance composed 8.4 percent of total F/A-18
program cost growth. Support variance reflects changes in
program cost not associated with flyaway cost. However, sup-
port items are generally a function of flyaway cost. Thus,
if quantity variance is positive, one would expect to see a
positive support variance. As was previously discussed, the
The approximation is made here that
$75 $ Then Year
(cost due to unrecognized inflation) (cost due to unrecognized inflation)
$75 total cost growth $ then total cost growth
While not precisely correct, the error is believed to be small
and correction would not justify detailed computations requir-




recognition of support cost may allow for some leveling of
cost growth rate, and some needed support may not be recognized
Generally, program managers can exercise some control over
support variance and can covertly suppress cost growth by
denying or delaying recognition of needed support.
7 . Degree of Program Manager Control
Table 10 summarizes opportunities for the program
manager's control of program cost growth.
TABLE 10













Estimating 34.2 (=15.9+18.3) JsYes 1 ; h No 2
Support 8.4 c 3Some
Total: 100.0
Notes Only the program manager commanding at the time
the development estimate was prepared could
control true estimating variance (15.9 percent)
Cost growth due to unrecognized inflation
appears here, (18.3 percent).
Program manager can hold down this category by
failing to recognize needed support. This rec-
ognition is not intended to justify this action
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This analysis indicates that the program manager had
no possible control of 70.0 percent of F/A-18 program cost
growth. Only the program manager in power at the time the
development estimate was prepared had any control over the
correctness of the baseline estimate. If this first program
manager is excluded, program managers were unable to exercise
control over 85.9 percent of F/A-18 program cost growth. The
only cost growth category for which the program manager could
be considered fully responsible is engineering variance and
this constitutes only 1.5 percent of total F/A-18 cost growth.
The program manager may have been expected to have had some
control over schedule variance (4.2 percent) and support
variance (8.4 percent).
F. POSSIBLE FUTURE COST GROWTH
This researcher does not foresee a significant likelihood
of significant cost growth associated with engineering changes
or schedule changes. A future decrease in the inventory ob-
jective could yield a cost reduction with respect to total
program cost, but this would increase the average cost of
units that are purchased. Additional support requirements
may produce some cost growth. The main categories of possible
future cost growth are believed to be economic change and
estimating change. Not surprisingly, these are the two cate-
gories that have experienced the largest variance since the
development estimate was established.
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All these categories will be addressed below in greater
detail. The order of presentation is the same as is used
throughout this chapter.
1 . Future Economic Change
There is always some possibility that the future will
bring a time of stable or decreasing prices. However, his-
torically the F/A-18 program has developed during periods of
increasing prices and the general expectation is that these
conditions will continue. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense estimates of upcoming inflation have been consistently
lower than actual F/A-18 experience and the errors have been
greater the further they extended into the future. As an
example, consider the evolution of inflation estimates for
1980 procurement, from the time of the development estimate
17
through 1978. These data are presented in Table 11.
TABLE 11
EVOLUTION OF THE OSD ESTIMATE OF INFLATION (PROCUREMENT)
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980
Date of
Estimate






Recall from Chapter two that the Fiscal Year 1980 Budget
was being prepared during Calendar Year 1978.
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The estimate of inflation for 1980 increased every
year but only to a maximum of 6.2 percent. The Naval Air
Systems Command estimated that the "actual" inflation rate
for F/A-18 procurement was 12.8 percent in 1980.
Estimating future inflation rates is a difficult task.
However, there are econometric models (Warton and Data Re-
sources Incorporated, to name two) which have predicted infla-
tion more accurately than the estimates issued by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
Officials working in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) offered insight into the
reason why their inflation estimates are often unrealistically
low. One very senior official stated, "While the directives
and instructions refer to the escalation indexes as OSD rates,
they really come from the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB) and are in support of the President's economic program.
0MB believes estimates of inflation may be self-fulfilling
and to 'realistically' budget for inflation would seem to
provide governmental sanctions (for) a stated rate of inflation."
Given this understanding coupled with the observed
historical relationship between the Office of the Secretary
of Defense estimates of inflation and actual experience, it
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the economic vari-




progresses. Therefore, economic change is expected to sub-
stantially contribute to future cost growth.
A number of alternative methods of budgeting for in-
flation are currently being discussed within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. These alternative methods include:
a) development of a separate deflator (index); 2) budgeting
at 0MB projected rates and seeking supplemental appropriations;
and, 3) constant dollar budgeting and incremental funding.
An Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Staff White
Paper discussing the pros and cons of these alternatives is
presented in Appendix E.
2 . Future Quantity Change
The F/A-18 inventory objectives are dictated by mili-
tary requirements. The requirement for the F/A-18 to fulfill
the role as replacement for F-4 and A-7 airplanes is pressing,
and in the words of one former systems command admiral, inter-
viewed by this researcher, "...irreplaceable unless we are
willing to accept 20-year old technology." (He was referring
to buying more A-7's in lieu of F/A-18's).
However, only the future will show the total number
of F/A-18 to be actually produced. Every year the U. S. bud-
get is constrained by estimated dollar resources regardless
of the total obligation authority already approved for years
1
8
The current estimate of total program cost incorporates
OSD escalation estimates out to 1989.
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in the Five Year Defense Plan. This being the case, each year
a service budget may be reduced by the Department of Defense,
the Office Management and Budget, or by the President himself
before the budget is submitted to the Congress.
This being the case, it is in order to quantitatively
analyze the impact that reducing inventory objectives would
have on program cost.
Reducing the inventory objective would reduce total
program cost. However, the total reduction would be less
than the average unit cost times the number of units reduced.
This is because of the learning curve effect and is apparent
when studying the estimated flyaway unit cost data depicted
in Figure 35.
The solid line on Figure 35 shows the history of fly-
away unit cost estimates as they appeared in the Selected
Acquisition Reports. When the decision was made in 1978 to
increase the inventory objective from 800 airplanes to 1366,
the estimated flyaway unit cost dropped because these later
airplanes can be produced with more efficiency.
The dashed line shows the flyaway unit cost data ad-
19justed back to an 800 airplane basis. To have decided
during 1980 to reduce the inventory objective from 1366 air-
planes to 800 airplanes would have been to have suffered an
19These data were adjusted by removing the quantity vari-
ance and the support variance associate with production air-
planes 801 through 1366, and by proportionally (566 \ 1566=0.41)








1977 1978 1979 1980
Figure 55. Estimated Flyaway Unit Cost
approximately 0.5 million 1975 dollar cost growth (per unit
basis) . The reduction in estimated total flyaway cost would be
1366 Flyaway Airplanes x g- 5 million 1975 $ , u s billion 1975 $J ' r Flyaway Airplane
onn r?i \- i 8.9 million 1975 $ _ ,. . .... m800 Flyawav .Airplanes x ^, x^z=r\ = 7.1 billion 19/5 $1 * Flyaway Airplane
Cost reduction due
to decreased inven-
tory objective: 4.4 billion 1975 $
In this example the inventory objective was reduced
41.4 percent but the reduction to estimated total flyaway cost




3. Future Schedule Change
There is always another option to reducing the inven-
tory objective in face of budget constraints. That option is
to slow the production rates and still procure the revised
number of airplanes but over a longer period. This increases
the base year dollar estimate of total program cost because
the contractors' overhead must be supported over a longer
period of time. It increases the then year estimate of total
program cost even further because the stretched out outlays
will have a longer exposure to inflation.
The F/A-18 program already has experienced some cost
growth due to schedule variance, but it has not been large
relative to other categories. Additionally, fleet force
requirements will constrain production stretch outs. Cost




The F/A-18 development flight test program is nearing
completion; technical deficiencies have been identified;
corrections have been conceived and incorporated; and in most
cases, the corrections have been successfully evaluated. The
production design is becoming firm. This being the case,
engineering change is not expected to yield significant future
cost growth.
5 Future Estimating Variance
It was previously shown that estimating variance con-
stituted the largest F/A-18 variance category. It was further
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shown that approximately one-half of this category represented
cost growth due to unrecognized inflation due to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense estimates of inflation being lower
than the inflation actually experienced. The other half of
F/A-18 estimating variance resulted from an overly optimistic
development estimate of program cost.
a. Unrecognized Inflation
Unless the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Navy change policy in order to realistically recognize
inflation in weapon system acquisitions, estimating variance
will continue to increase, and will represent a significant
contribution to future total program cost growth.
b. Optimistic Development Estimate
Continued realization of an overly optimistic
development estimate may also contribute to future cost growth
Consider Figures 36 and 37.
Figure 36 shows a least- squares line fitted to
approximate the F/A-18 development estimate, cost -quantity
20
curve." This development estimate, cost-quantity curve was
derived without the benefit of actual production experience.
This least squares line is of the form
C = a Q. b
1 o x i
20
The development estimate cost quantity curve does not
represent a true learning or improvement curve because, among
other things, contractor overhead and other fixed cost are
included in the function. This contributes to the curvelinear
shape (log-log plot) .
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Figure 36. F/A-18 Development Cost-Quantity Curve
where C- is the cost of the Q-th unit, and a equals 41.7
million 1975 dollars, an equivalent to the theoretical cost
of the first production unit, and
b =
ln " sl °P e " =
-0.342
in 2
Therefore the average "slope" = 79 percent. That is, the
F/A-18 unit cost after a doubling of the quantity produced
would be approximately 79 percent of the former cost.
In December 1979, a current estimate, cost-quantity
curve was published in the Selected Acquisition Report. This
represented the development estimate, cost-quantity curve
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corrected for actual production experience gained during
assembly of prototype and test article F/A-18's.
This current estimate, cost-quantity curve and a
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Figure 37. F/A-18 Current Estimate (December 1979),
Cost-Quantity Curve
Here the fitted line is also of the form:
C = a Q. b
1 o x i
but now a = 49.6 million 1975 dollars and b = -0.329;
o
'
therefore the average "slope" = 80 percent.
By comparing the development estimate, least
square line to the current estimate, least squares line the
following may be observed:
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• The cost of the F/A-18 theoretical first unit was
greater than that indicated in the development estimate
fa for the current estimate (41.7 million 1975 dollars)
*• o
is greater than a for the development estimate (49.6° o r
million 1975 dollars)
.
• The cost reduction associated with a doubling of quantity
was slightly less than anticipated in the development
estimate. (Development estimate "slope" = 79 percent
current estimate slope = 80 percent. Recall that the
greater the "slope" the slower the cost reduction).
These differences are recognized in the positive
estimating variance in the current Selected Acquisition Re-
port, and reflect the overly optimistic development estimate.
Since some actual production experience has now
been accumulated, the theoretical cost of the first unit of
production (a ) may be considered fixed. However, since it
is still very early in the production phase, the actual "slope"
is still not known with high confidence. If the average
"slope" of a least-squares line fitted to future current esti-
mates is greater than 80 percent, the development estimate will
have further proven to have been overly optimistic. This
could result in recognition of significant future cost growth.
Some quantitative insight into the magnitude
of possible cost growth may be gained by using the current
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least squares approximation to calculate the relative total
21
flyaway cost assuming a slightly higher average "slope."
For example, the results of these analyses are
presented in Table 12.
TABLE 12
POSSIBLE COST GROWTH AS A FUNCTION OF COST-QUANTITY
CURVE, AVERAGE "SLOPE," WHERE THE RELATIVE MAGNITUDE
OF F/A-18 TOTAL FLYAWAY COST IS REFERENCED TO THE DEC
1979 SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORT, 22 CURRENT ESTIMATE,
COST-QUANTITY CURVE FOR UNIT FLYAWAY COST. (Average
"slope" = 80 percent.)
"Cost-Quantity
Curve Average "Slope"
Relative Magnitude of Total




This analysis shows the very powerful effect that
estimates regarding the cost-quantity curve "slope" can have
21 That is
.1377 .1377
t„* i n / n b,n , Q , I n (In "slope'Vln") dQ.Total flyaway cost = / a
^i dQ-=49.6 / Q-j x
12 12
For the Dec. 1979 current estimate, where the average "slope"
equaled 80 percent this function equals k, a constant which
will be the basis of the relative measurement. (This curve
is integrated from 12 through 1377 because the 1566 production
airplanes are produced after 11 development (test article)
airplanes are produced.) ("Slope" must be expressed in deci-
mal form.)
22 The cost-quantity curve was not updated in 1980, there-
fore this analysis focuses on 1979.
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on total flyaway cost. As may be seen in Table 12, if the
average "slope" of the cost quantity curve turns out to be
82 percent instead of the 80 percent estimated in the December
1979 Selected Acquisition Report; then the total flyaway cost
will be approximately 21 percent greater than that reported
in December 1979. The total flyaway cost reported in the
December 1979 Selected Acquisition Report was 9.3 billion
1975 dollars. A 21 percent increase in total Flyaway Cost
would therefore contribute (9.3 billion x 1.21 - 9.5 billion = )
1.95 billion base year dollars to the total program cost.
It can be seen that if the average "slope" of
the estimated cost-quantity curve is overly optimistic (i.e.,
if the contractors unit cost does not decrease as ^estimated
with a doubling of quantity) then significant cost growth
will result.
6 . Future Support Variance
There is a possibility that increased support cost
will be incurred during the F/A-18 program. Interviewees
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense generally held
forth that the support cost of the F/A-18 program (and almost
all other aircraft procurement programs) was underestimated;
however, no quantitative estimates were offered. Navy inter-
viewees maintained that the emphasis placed on systems reli-
ability in the F/A-18 program will yield savings in support
costs reported in the current selected Acquisition Report are
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accurate. Support changes may contribute to future cost
arowth, but further analysis is bevond the scope of this
research.
G. CHAPTER III SUMMARY
This chapter analyzed the elements that make up the F/A-18
acquisition program and the magnitude of cost growth experi-
enced in the program. Next, the selected acquisition report
cost variance categories were evaluated and expanded to con-
sider the effects of unrecognized inflation. Then information
gained from the calculation of cost growth due to unrecognized
inflation was used to further refine the analysis of the mag-
nitude of cost growth. Succeedingly an assessment of the
program manager's capability to control cost growth was offered
Finally, areas of possible future cost growth were identified.
A more detailed report of general and specific conclusions is




This chapter will present general and specific conclusions
drawn from the analysis presented in Chapter Three.
A. GENERAL CONCLUSION
This research reveals that the F/A-18 program cost growth
is approximately 10 percent when both quantity change and
actual inflation are considered, and that the program manager
has little control over cost growth. Inflation and possible
failure to realize the expected cost-quantity relationships
are identified as likely areas of significant future cost
growth.
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
This section will first specify the major elements that
make up the F/A-18 airplane program and will then summarize
the analysis of the magnitude of total program cost growth.
Next, the major factors which have contributed to the cost
growth will be reviewed and the possible controllability of
those factors by the program manager will be discussed. Fi-
nally, likely areas for future cost growth will be identified.
Before proceeding, two definitions will be reiterated:
Then Year Dollars - The total program cost in then
year dollars is the sum of all the annual appropriations
required for the program. This sum of required appropriations
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reflects assumptions made by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense regarding expected inflation rates.
Base Year Dollars - The total program cost in base
year dollars is the total value of the program assuming that
the purchasing power of the dollar existing in 1975 (when
the development estimate was prepared) remained constant
throughout the life of the program.
1 . Major Elements of the F/A-18 Program
The total cost estimate of the F/A-18 program is re-
ported in the December 1980 Selected Acquisition Report as
38 billion then dollars or 15.8 base year (1975) dollars.
Three major elements constitute the F/A-18 program: develop
ment, procurement, and military construction cost. The cost
and the relative magnitude of each of these elements are pre
sented in Table 13.
TABLE 15







Development 1.6 Billion 10.5
Procurement 14.1 Billion 89.3
Military
Construction 0.1 Billion 0.2




The F/A-18 development cost reflects all research,
engineering and test and evaluation expenses and is indepen-
dent of the inventory objective. The development phase of
the acquisition is nearing completion and most of the 1.6
billion 1975 dollar cost is now a sunk cost.
b. Procurement Cost
The procurement cost mirrors the estimated cost
of the planned acquisition of 1566 Flyaway airplanes plus the
requested support and spare parts. By far procurement com-
poses the largest portion of F/A-18 total program cost.
c. Military Construction
The military construction cost includes the esti-
mated cost to construction training facilities peculiar to
the F/A-18. The military construction element represents a
very small proportion of total program cost.
2. Total F/A-18 Program Cost Growth
The magnitude of F/A-18 program cost growth, relative
to the development estimate, is presented in Table 14 on a
number of different bases.
On a then year dollar basis the total program cost
growth reported in the December 1980 Selected Acquisition
Report is almost 2 % . However, this figure includes the
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On a base year dollar basis the total program cost
growth reported in the December 1980 Selected Acquisition
Report is almost 100 percent. This report of the base year
dollars cost growth considers the Office of the Secretary of
Defense estimates of inflation but does not consider the fact
that much of increase in real assets required resulted from
the decision to acquire 1366 airplanes vice the development
estimate of 800 airplanes.
To make a better comparison between the development
estimate of total program cost and the current (December 1980)
estimate must be adjusted to take out this quantity increase.
On the basis of the base year program cost adjusted for the
quantity change the cost growth is 32 percent. However, this
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figure still reflects the cost growth due to the inflation
over and above that recognized by the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense.
If the 1.8 billion 1975 dollar cost growth due to
this unrecognized inflation is removed, the cost growth may
be expressed on a basis where the current estimate has been
adjusted for both the quantity change and for the discrepancy
between the Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates of
inflation and the actual inflation experienced during past
years. Thus, on the basis of the base year dollar cost ad-
justed for the quantity change and for actual inflation, the
program cost growth is only 10 percent.
3 . F/A-18 Major Cost Growth Factors
The major cost growth factors were analyzed via the
variance categories defined in the Selected Acquisition Re-
ports. A quantitative summary is presented in Table 15 and
amplifying comments are offered below.
a. Economic Variance
The economic variance represents the increased
program cost associated solely with the operation of the
economy as estimated by inflation indices issued by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
b. Quantity Variance
The quantity variance represents the cost associ-
ated with the 1978 decision to increase the F/A-18 inventory
















Estimating 34.2 (=15 . 9+18 . 3) Note X
Support 8.4
Total 100.0%
NOTE 1: The 15.9 percent is true estimating
error and the 18.3 percent is cost
growth due to unrecognized inflation.
c. Schedule Variance
The schedule variance reflects the additional cost
associated with changes to the procurement schedule envisioned
in the development estimate.
d. Engineering Variance
The engineering variance represents the cost of
physical and functional characteristic changes to the system.
e. Estimating Variance
Estimating variance is defined by the Selected
Acquisition Report instructions as the change in program cost
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due to correction of errors in preparing the development
estimate. This definition is misleading because there are
really two parts to estimating variance. The first part is
true estimating error just as the definition indicates. How-
ever, the second part reflects the cost growth due to unrec-
ognized inflation. This cost growth due to unrecognized
inflation comes about because the inflation estimates issued
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense were lower than the
inflation actually experienced by the F/A-18 contractors.
The outlays required to make up for inflation, over and above
that recognized by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
show up as estimating variance. The F/A-18 cost growth due
to unrecognized inflation equates to 1.8 billion 1975 dollars
as of December 1980, and constitutes 18.3 percent of the total
program cost growth.
The true estimating error amounts to 15.9 percent
of the total cost growth. Together the true estimating error
plus the cost growth due to unrecognized inflation total to
(18.3 + 15.9 = 34.2 percent) the cost growth attributed to
estimating variance.
f. Support Variance
The last category, support variance, reflects
any changes in program cost associated with spare parts,
training and ancillary equipment.
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4 . Cost Growth Controllable by Program Managers
This research indicates that surprisingly little of
the total F/A-18 program cost growth is controllable by the
program manager. The economic variance, and the portion of
the estimating variance representing the cost growth due to
unrecognized inflation are uncontrollable by the manager.
The quantity variance reflects changes in inventory objectives
determined by the Chief of Naval Operations (among others)
and is also uncontrollable by the program manager. The pro-
gram manager has only some control over schedule variance
since he can impact the testing schedule but he has no control
over program stretch outs that are a product of the PPBS pro-
cess. The program manager may have some influence over the
support variance in that he may hold down support cost by
failing to recognize needed support. Only the program manager
in command during the formulation of the development estimate
can have any influence over true estimating variance, and
this influence may be politically constrained. The program
manager has clear control over only engineering variance and
this category comprises only 1.5 percent of the F/A-18 total
program cost growth. Table 16 summarizes the program mana-
ger's control over cost growth.
For example, it may be observed that if every program
manager had improved his managerial efficiency by 20 percent,




SUMMARY OF PROGRAM MANAGER OPPORTUNITY
FOR COST GROWTH CONTROL
Opportunity











Note 1: If control by first program manager
(the one responsible for the devel-
opment estimate) is excluded the "No"
category increases to 85.9 percent
and the "Yes" category decreases to
1.51.
experienced by only six percent. If program managers sub-
sequent to the program manager who was responsible for the
formulation of the development estimate had improved their
managerial efficiency by 20 percent, they would have been
able to reduce the program cost growth by only 2.8 percent. "*
Clearly most cost growth is beyond the control of the program
manager
(0.20 x (schedule variance + engineering variance + support variance +
true estimating variance) x 100) = (0.20 x (0.042 + 0.015 + 0.084 + 0.159) x
100 = 6 percent.
2
(0.20 x (schedule variance + engineering variance + support variance) x
100) = (0.20 x (0.042 + 0.015 + 0.084) x 100) = 2.8 percent.
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5 . Possible Future Cost Growth
Two possible areas of major future cost growth are
identified in the analysis presented in Chapter Three. The
areas are associated with economic variance and estimating
variance
.
Data presented in Chapter Three clearly shows that
the inflation estimates issued by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense are generally lower than the "actual" inflationary
experience of the aerospace industry. This is noted to be
true for political reasons because Government believes that
recognition of more realistic estimates might imply tacit
approval for higher rates of inflation. This phenomenon of
unrealistically low Office of the Secretary of Defense esti-
mates of inflation is not expected to change. Therefore,
economic variance and the cost growth due to unrecognized in-
flation that is included within estimating variance are expect-
ed to continue to grow, and significant, future cost growth
is likely to result.
True estimating variance may also continue to grow.
A least squares approximation to the development estimate,
cost-quantity curve shows a 79 percent improvement rate. When
the cost-quantity curve is updated based on early production
experience the average improvement rate estimate is adjusted to
80 percent. The analysis presented in Chapter Three shows
that program cost is very sensitive to the estimated cost-
quantity relationship. Specifically, an example was offered
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that showed that if the F/A-18 average improvement rate degen-
erates two percent to 82 percent, the total flyaway cost may
be expected to increase as much as 21 percent.
6 . Summary
The F/A-18 program cost growth does not appear to be
excessive once adjustments are made for the increased inventory
objectives and for actual inflation. Little of the program
cost growth was controllable by the program manager. Inflation
was the major contributor to cost growth and its contribution
is expected to continue to increase during future program years
The estimate of total program cost is very sensitive to assump-
tions made with regard to cost-quantity relationships. Failure
to experience the expected reductions in cost associated with





THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON " 20301
April 30, .981
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Improving the Acquisition Process
On 2 March 1981, I directed a 30-day assessment of
the Defense acquisition system with the priority objectives
of reducing cost, making the acquisition process more effi-
cient, increasing the stability of programs, and decreasing
the acquisition time of military hardware. The report,
delivered to me on 31 March 1981, provided many specific
recommendations and posed a number of major issues for
decision.
I have discussed the report with the Steering Group,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and
the Under Secretaries and selected Assistant Secretaries of
Defense. 3ased on the report and those meetings, the
Secretary and I have decided to make major changes both in
the acquisition philosophy and the acquisition process
itself. We are convinced that we have now a historic and
unique opportunity to significantly improve the Defense
acquisition system. We a3k for your cooperation and assist-
ance in carrying out these decisions.
The acquisition decisions are recorded in detail in the
attachments to this memorandum. I would like to highlight
here the major decisions and their implications for DoD in
the following paragraphs.
DoD Acquisition Management Philosophy
The DoD management philosophy that I described in
my 27 March 1981 PPBS decision memorandum also applies to
the acquisition policy and process. Through controlled
decentralization, subordinate line executives will be held
accountable for the execution of policy decisions and programs
as approved. The review of the acquisition process is a good
example of participative management where the Services and
other DoD staffs, working together, have jointly agreed on
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what should be done. All points of view were considered prior
to decision. Now that decisions are made , the Secretary and
I expect full support of DoD staffs and the Services in
implementation.
I affirm the following acquisition management principles:
1. We must improve long-range planning to enhance
acquisition program stability.
2. Both OSD and the Services must delegate more
responsibility, authority and accountability for programs;
in particular, the Service program manager should have the
responsibility, authority and resources adequate to execute
efficiently the program for which he is responsible.
3. We must examine evolutionary alternatives which
use a lower risk approach to technology than solutions at
the frontier of technology.
4. We must achieve more economic rates of production.
5. We must realistically cost, budget, and fully
fund in the FYDP and Extended Planning Annex, procurement,
logistics and manpower for major acquisition programs.
5. Readiness and sustainabiiity of deployed weapons
are primary objectives and must be considered from the start
of weapon system programs.
7. A strong industrial base is necessary for a strong
defense. The proper arms- length relationships with industry
should not be interpreted by DoO or industry as adversarial.
DoD-OMB and Congress
Many of the decisions announced in this memorandum
can be implemented within DoD's legislative authority. Some
decisions need to be coordinated with OMB. A number of
recommendations will need Congressional action before final
implementation can take place. In those latter cases, we
will work closely with appropriate Congressional committees
and their staffs to explain and justify our recommendations
for changes to legislative requirements.
DoD-Industry Relationship
While DoD should be tough in contract negotiations
as part of the buyer-seller relationship, this does not
mean that relationships between management and industry
should necessarily be adversarial. Industry and government
have a shared responsibility and must assume a new spirit of
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cooperation. A healthy, innovative, and competitive
industrial capability is a primary national objective.
I direct all top DoD management, in OSD, in JCS , and in
the Services, to ensure this is understood at all levels.
Economies, Efficiencies and Savings
A primary objective in streamlining the DoD acqui-
sition process is reducing costs. All" DoD staffs" "arid"
Service managers should keep this uppermost in their minds.
We all must be more aggressive and imaginative in looking
for ways to save money throughout all phases of the acquisi-
tion process. I look to each of you to use your enhanced
authority to bring about ma] or savings and improved methods
of operation.
Decisions to Improve Acquisition Policv and Process
The Secretary and I are determined to reduce substan-
tially cost overruns, deploy adequate quantities of needed
systems that are operationally effective and ready, and do
this in the shortest possible time. We are convinced that
the actions directed in the_ attachment will significantly
contribute to achieving these objectives. The major deci-
sions for improvement can be summarized in four categories
:
Reduce Acquisition Cost
° Increase program stability by fully funding R&D
and procurement at levels sufficient to ensure efficient
cost, supportability and schedule performance, and minimizing ''-
changes to the approved program.
° Implement multi-year procurement to improve production
processes, increase economy-of-scaie lot buying, decrease
financial borrowing costs and reduce administrative burden
in contracting.
o Reduce administrative costs by simplifying proce-
dures, seeking relief from costly legislative requirements
and reducing the number of DoD regulations and directives.
° Encourage capital investment to increase productivity
in the defense industry by improved contracting, more reason-
able risk sharing, and increased incentives.
o Promote Services use of economic production rates
to reduce unit costs and decrease acquisition time.
° Require Services to budget to most likely cost to




° Implement Preplanned Product Improvement to reduce
unit costs and decrease acquisition time.
° Provide adequate "front end" funding for test hardware.
Improve Weapons Support and Readiness
° Stress acquisition strategies that provide incentives
to contractors to attain reliability and maintainability goals.
° Establish readiness objectives early in development
programs
.
Improve the DSARC Process
° Move toward controlled decentralization of the acquisi-
tion process to the Services.
o Reduce the data and briefings required by the Services
and other OoO staffs.
o Tie the acquisition process more closely to the PP3S.
Implementation of the Decisions
Implementation of the decisions announced in this
memorandum is as important as the decisions tnemselves. Many
decisions, even those within DoO ' s authority, will take time
to implement fully. A large number of DoD managers will have
to take part on a worldwide basis.
I assign overall responsibility to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research, Engineering and Acquisition for moni-
toring and follow-up of all decisions in this report. I expect
him to establish an appropriate implementing and reporting
system. The fir3t report will be submitted to me by the end
of May and every month thereafter 'until further notice.
3oth the Secretary and I appreciate the work you and your
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The Steering Group recommends that the Deputy Secretary of
Defense reaffirm the following major acquisition management
principles:
1. An improved statement of long-range Defense policy,
strategy and resources will be provided to the Services in order
to establish a framework for military objectives, goals, and
mission planning to enhance program stability.
2. Responsibility, authority and accountability for programs
should be at the lowest levels of the organization at which a
total view of the program rests.
3. Service Program Managers should have the responsibility,
authority, resources, and guidelines (goals and thresholds)
adequate to efficiently execute the program. This should
include the system specific acquisition strategy for attainment
of the required operational and readiness capability, and appro-
priate flexibility to tailor the acquisition strategy to estimates
of the development priorities and risks.
4. Evolutionary alternatives which use a lower risk approach
to technology must be examined when new programs are proposed.
Solutions at the frontiers of technology must provide an alternative
which offers an evolutionary approach. Pre-planned Product Improve-
ment (PI) should become an integral part of the Acquisition Strategy.
5. Achievement of economic rates of production is a fundamental
goal of the acquisition process.
6. The Services should plan to realistically budget and fully
fund in the FYDP and Extended Planning Annex (EPA) the R&D, procure-
ment, logistics and manpower costs at the levels necessary to protect
the acquisition schedule established at program approval points, and
to achieve acceptable readiness levels.
7. Improved readiness is a primary objective of the acquisition
process of comparable importance to reduced unit cost or reduced
acquisition time. Resources to achieve readiness will receive the
same emphasis as those required to achieve schedule or performance
objectives. Include from the start of weapon system programs
designed- in reliability, maintainability and support.
8. The proper "arms- Length 1* buyer-seller relationship should
not be interpreted by government or industry as adversarial. The
DoD should be tough in contract negotiations. 3ut weapons acqui-
sition should be managed on a participating basis using industry
as a full constructive team member. A strong industrial base is
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A revolutionary system development approach which uses new
and untried technology to meet a military threat can offer
dramatic potential payoffs, but frequently ends up with large
cost increases and schedule slippages.
An evolutionary approach offers an alternative which minimizes
technological risk, and consciously inserts advanced technology
through planned upgrades of those deployed subsystems which offer
the greatest benefits- In this manner the lead time to field
technological advances can be shortened while an aggressive
scheduling of fielded performance improvements can be expected
during the service life of the systems. This concept is called
Preplanned Product Improvement (P3i) , and is commonly used in
commercial industry.
Recommendation - Most new and existing systems should be
*- partitioned for performance growth through the application of
sequential upgrades to key subsystems in order to reduce development
risk, and take best advantage of technological advance.
Advantages - Can reduce acquisition time, reduce develop-
ment risk and cost, and enhance fielded performance through the
deployment of upgrades. A revolutionary approach can always be \
adopted when the demands of the threat or other compelling y
military needs require such an approach.
Disadvantages - The performance needed to meet a critical
threat may dictate the use of distant technology, but the factors
involved in such a decision are seldom incisive. Therefore, the
choice between alternatives is not likely to be absolutely clear.
Action Required :
- OSDRE, working with the Services, develop within 30
days a plan for implementing Preplanned Product Improvement including
definitions and criteria for application.
USDRE request the Services to evaluate ongoing programs
to determine potential for payoff from the application of preplanned
product improvement, and to present results at the next DSARC.
USDRE assure Services have fixed the responsibility for
review of opportunities for product improvement after any system
reaches the field, and to develop a product improvement plan.
Approved: fl^
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Recommendation : Encourage extensive use of multiyear
procurement based upon a case-by-case benefit/risk analysis.
Advantages : Multiyear procurement could result in average
dollar savings of 10 to 20% in unit procurement cost through
improved economies and efficiencies in production processes,
economy-of-scale lot buying, decreased financial borrowing
costs, better utilization of industrial facilities, and a reduction
in the administrative burden in the placement and administration
of contracts. In addition, the stimulated investment in production
equipment will result in lower-defect, higher quality products.
The market stability will also enhance the continuity of subcon-
tractor supply lines and thereby decrease acquisition time. Surge
capability will also be improved.
Disadvantages : This funding technique fences in money and
commits future Congresses. If used to excess, it would significantly
reduce the flexibility of the Secretary of Defense to respond to
unforeseen changes in the external threat. If a multiyear procure-
ment was used to lock in a border line program, costs would be
increased if the program was' cancelled. In order to avoid these
potential disadvantages, the following criteria are recommended
as general guidelines to screen potential multiyear candidates:
(1) significant benefit to the Government; (2) stability of
requirements, configuration, and funding; and (3) degree of
confidence in cost estimates and contractor capabilities.
Action Required :
a. General Counsel must respond in writing to Congressman
Daniel's Bill HR 74 5.
b. USDRE and ASD (Comptroller) should brief Appropriation and
Armed Services Congressional Committees on recommended multiyear
procurement procedures and concepts.
c. USDRE should prepare special policy memorandum to the
Military Departments for SecDef signature defining procedures and
requesting identification of potential FY 3 3 multiyear procurement
candidates.
d. USDRE and ASD (Comptroller) should modify DoD Directive
7200.4 and the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) and should
interface with 0MB to modify Directive A-ll as required.
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INCREASE PROGRAM STABILITY IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Program instability is inherently costly in both time and
money. The 4 7 major programs covered by the December 31, 1980,
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) reflected total cost growth
of 129 percent over the Milestone II estimates. Reasons for
growth are economic or inflation [27 percent;
,
quantity changes
(26 percent), estimating changes (13 percent) , schedule changes
(15 percent), support changes (7 percent) , engmeermo chancres
(5 percent) , and other changes (2 percent) . Forty one (41)
percent of all cost growth is due to quantity and schedule changes.
Of the 47 programs, 19 have had quantity increases, 2C
quantity decreases, and 3 are unchanged. Schedule changes r.ave
resulted in reduced costs on 4 programs and increased costs on
41. The most common cause for these changes is financial. The
budget levels and relative priorities of competing programs force
tough decisions to terminate programs, reduce the number of weap-
ons, stretch the development program, delay planned production or
stretch the planned buy.
Recommendation : SecOef, OSD and Services should fully fund
the R&D and procurement of major systems at levels necessary to
protect the acquisition schedule established at the time the pro-
gram is baselined, currently Milestone II. Limit stretch-outs
-due to funding constraints (except when mandated by the Secretary
or Congress) . Establish procedures which will phase the
scheduling of sequential milestones so that manpower "peaks and
valleys" can be minimized consistent with balancing the risks. In
general, only changes which are directed by changed requirements
or development problems should be made.
Advantages : Reduces costs and saves time by stabilizing
schedules
,
quantities , and production rates. Will enhance the
ability to plan force modernizations.
Disadvantages : Budget flexibility will be reduced.
Action Required : SecDef directs that during program and
budget reviews by OSD (DRB) the Service Secretaries must explain
and justify differences between program baselines established at
Milestone II and the quantity and funding in the program or budget
under review.
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ENCOURAGE: CAPITAL INVESTMENT TC ENHANCE gaODCCTIVITY
Productivity in the defense sector of the U.S. economy has
been lagging, in large part because of low levels of capital
investment compared to U.S. manufacturing in general. Cash flow
problems, tax policy, high interest rates, and how return on
investment (ROD tend to limit available investment capital. The
industry views low profits and program instability as precluding
investment in capital equipment. This situation has two ma; or
implications: a tendency to shift from defense to commercial
business, and a decrease in funds available for faciiitizaticn.
Recommendation : Encourage capital investment.
Advantages : will increase long-term investments which should
lead to lower unit costs of weapons systems. Increase productivity,
Disadvantages : Earlier Government disbursements. Some
reduction in tax revenues.
Action Required ; USDRE should have the prime responsibility
to implement the following actions working closely with General
Counsel, Legislative Affairs, and the Service Material Commands.
a. General Counsel should support legislative initiatives
to permit more rapid capital equipment depreciation and to
recognize replacement depreciation costs by amending or repealing
Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 409, "Depreciation of Tangible
Assets.
"
b. Structure contracts to permit companies to share in cost
reductions resulting from productivity investments. Modify the
Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) profit formula. Allow for
award fees inversely proportional to maintainability costs.
c. Increase use and frequency of milestone billings and
advanced funding. Expedite paying cycle.
d. Provide for negotiation of profit levels commensurate
with risk and contractor investment; ensure that recent profit
policy changes are implemented at all levels.
e. Instruct the Services of the need to grant equitable
Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) clauses in all appropriate
procurements. Contract price adjustments made in accordance
with EPA provisions should recognize the impact of inflation on
profits. Ensure that these clauses are extended to subcontractors.
f. Increase emphasis on Manufacturing Technology Programs.
g. Provide a consistent policy which will promote innovation
by giving contractors all the economic and commercial incentives
of the patent system. Provide policies to protect proprietary
rights and data.
h. General Counsel should work to repeal the vinson-
Tr&mmell Act.
Approved: yj\^
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BUDGET TO MOST LIKELY COSTS
Intentionally low initial cost estimates are a prime contri-
bution to apparent cost growth. Program costs are sometimes pur-
posely understated either because OoD is forcing a program to fit
available funding rather than the funding it takes to do the ;ob,
or because the contractors are purposely lowering their cost esti-
mates in order to win a contract with hopes of recovering costs on
follow-on contracts. Either practice is referred to as "buying in."
When the actual cost; become apparent, DoD is severely criticized
for cost overruns and there are insufficient funds available to
procure at economic production rates. Also, the negotiated contract
cost does not include future engineering changes or post-contract
award negotiations which can drive costs higher.
Recommendation : Require the Services to budget to most likely
or expected costs, including predictable cost increases due to risk.
Provide incentives for acquisition officers and industry to make
and use realistic cost estimates.
Advantages : Less cost growth. More realistic long-term de-
fense acquisition budget. Increased program stability.
Disadvantages : Difficulty in determining if a contractor is
providing realistic estimates. Political difficulty in rejecting
bids that project prices lower than costs. Difficult to budget )
funding greater than publicly-known contractual funding.
Action Required : ASD(C) require the Services to budget to most
likely or expected costs including predictable cost increases due to
risk, instead of the contractually agreed-upon cost. rJSDRE and the
Services provide incentives for acquisition officers and contractors
to accurately project cost3, including financial incentives and per-
formance evaluation considerations to DoD personnel, and profit in-
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The cost and time needed to put a weapon system into the
field can be reduced by establishing and sustaining economic
rates of production (i.e., the rate at which unit cost doesn't
decrease significantly with further rate increases) . Tight
budgets and strong competition between programs have forced
many programs to accept funding levels in the budget which will
not sustain an economic rate of production.
A commitment to economic production rates cannot rule out
sound arguments for lower (or higher) rates. For example, the
Services may wish to stretch a program over a number of years
in order to preserve a warm production base to permit rapid
mobilization to meet a crisis or war. However, this requires
stockpiling of materials, parts and subsystems to be effective.
Recommendation ; Services must use economic production
rates in their program and budget, requests, or explain and be
prepared to defend the reason why a different rate was selected.
Advantages : Save time and reduce cost of acquiring new
systems
.
Disadvantages : Will buy out the total system faster
(shorter production run for a given quantity) with peak funding
competing with other systems, possible workload fluctuations in
certain industries with occasional dead time and possible erosion
of the industrial base. Can increase cost of correcting support
problems.
Action Required : Secretary of Defense establish policy
requiring Services to fund programs at economic rates or justify
any differences during budget reviews by OSD and the ORB. USDRE
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ASSURE APPROPRIATE CONTRACT TYPE
Industry has repeatedly, over a long period, expressed serious
concerns about the recurring use of the wrong type of contract- Ir
particular, fixed price contracts are frequently employed for
RDT&E and early production, which have legitimate cost uncertain-
ties. This leads to a high risk situation for the contractors and
to cost overruns for DoD. Current DoD policies and regulations
give guidance as to the use of appropriate contract types; however,
this guidance is not being followed in the field.
Recommendation : Give the Program Managers the responsibility
to tailor contract types to balance program needs and cost savings
with realistic assessment of an acceptable balance of contractor
and government risk. Recommendation 1/Management Principle 3
states that the Program Managers be given the authority to deter-
mine the specific acquisition strategy.
Advantages: Precludes a company from being forced to assume
cost risk beyond their financial ability.
May increase competition if contractor risks
are recognized.
Gives the Program Managers more flexibility to
accommodate program needs
.
Disadvantages : Government assumes more cost risk.
Action Required : USDRE establish an OSD, Service, Industry
working group to develop an implementation plan to ensure that
appropriate contract types are used. USDRE and the Service
Secretaries ensure that Program Managers have the responsibility
for determining the appropriate contract type. USDRE should
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II-!PP,OVE SYSTEM SUPPORT AND READINESS
As a result of recurring problems with weapons system support,
the recent revision of acquisition policies includes a major em-
phasis on support issues, including reliability, maintenance,
spares, test equipment, and maintenance manpower. These recsr.r
policies are generally sound, are not directly influenced by the
major acquisition process options presently under consideration
and can be undertaken under any option.
To be effective the policies require Secretary of Defense
commitment. The need for this specific commitment results from
the competition among the conflicting objectives of high perform-
ance, lower cost, shorter schedules, better reliability and
maintenance, and support.
Recommendation ; Establish readiness objectives for each
development program to include estimates of the readiness Level
to be achieved at early fielding and at maturity. Implement
acquisition policy establishing "designed-in" reliability and
readiness capabilities. The implementation must emphasize the
objectives of shortening the overall time to deliver equipment to
the troops which meet mission and readiness needs ; the need for
improved estimates of the R&lD and support resources required; and
additionally, ask that some force elements (s) be targeted for a
major improvement in designed-in support capability to be less
dependent on a support tail.
Advantages : Clarifies that improvement in readiness is a
major objective of the Administration, and that implementation
must take place.
Disadvantages : Will require additional technical effort and
resources early in acquisition programs.
Action Required : MRA&L draft SecDef policy letter to be
issued within thirty days, reaffirming weapons support policy and
objectives, and tasking the Services to develop implementing
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REDUCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COST AND TIME TO PROCURE ITEMS
In 1974, less stringent requirements were established for
DOD Contract procedures associated with purchases under 310,000.
The purpose was to reduce both the time and paperwork costs to
a level commensurate with the value of the item being purchased.
Over the years the tendency of a bureaucracy to take precautions
has expanded the paperwork associated with a procurement, and
inflation has reduced the purchasing power of the dollar until
the $10,000 item of 1974 would cost almost twice that much to
purchase today.
A similar inequity exists in the administrative procedures
governing contract funding execution. Department of Defense and
Service procedures place numerous administrative requirements on
the obligation of funds. They provide unnecessarily cumbersome
safeguards for the public interest, to a certain extent thereby,
thwarting that interest. There is also a general tendency to
apply the most burdensome procedures, even if administrative
shortcuts are allowed. The DoD is motivating its contract and
fund administrators to avoid the least possibility of criticism
rather than to use economic procedures.
a. Recommendation : Raise the S10K limit for purchase order
contract use to 5 25K to accommodate inflation and reduce unneces-
sary paperwork and review. Letter is enroute from Joint Logistics
Commanders to DEPSECDEF recommending change. ' Proposal is cur-
rently in staffing at 0MB for inclusion in the Uniform Procure-
ment System (UPS) and as a legislative initiative.
Action Required ; DEPSECDEF recommend that 0MB (OFPP)
initiate change to 10 USC 2304.
b. Recommendation ; Raise threshold for contractor costing
data input from S1Q0K to S500K to accommodate inflation and
reflect current auditing procedures. (Paperwork load is such




Action Required : DEPSECDEF recommend that OMB (OFPP)
initiate legislative change to UaC 2306.
c. Recommendation ; Raise threshold for Service Secretary
review of Contract Determination and Findings (D&F) for RDT&E
from $100,000 to $1 million. Current level was set in mid-
1960s. Higher level would still cover 90 + % of expenditures
(dollars) . Higher limit supported by JLC.
169

Action Required: DepSecDef recommendation to OMB (0F?°) for
approval; sucsequer.t change to Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAB),
d. Recommenda t ion : Encourage greater use of class (D&~s) which
allows one D&F to cover multiple contracts. Reduces total volume
of contracts which must be reviewed, thus speeding up processing
time.
Action Required : USDR&E prepare policy statement encouraging
greater use of "class D&Fs.
e. Recommendation
:
Raise reprogramming thresholds from S2M
to S10M for RDT&E appropriations and from S5M to S23M for procurement
Thresholds were set 10 years ago with no inflation accommodation.
Greatly reduces Service flexibility to answer program.
Action Required : Renew SecDef/DepSecDef efforts to obtain
Congressional Committee approval (HASC, SASC, HAC, SAC) .
Advantages (all above recommendations) : Provides immediate re-
lief from unnecessary paperwork burden. Reduces administrative
lead time, which will result in reductions in in-house and industry
overhead cost. Supports a far more efficient Government cash flow
management.
Disadvantages : Less opportunities for legal reviews.
f. Recommendation : Eliminate the need for non-Secretarial level
D&Fs for competitive negotiated contract awards.
Advantages
:
Reduced paperwork and administrative lead times.
In conjunction with recommendation C above, to increase D&F thresholds,
the D&F requirement would be considerably reduced.
Disadvantages : Many smaller procurement actions would not be
reviewed above program office level.
Action Required : SecDef submit recommended legislation to
review public law.
g. Overall Action : USDR&E prepare implementation plan and re-
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INCORPORATE THE fJSE OF BODGETSD FUNDS
FOR TECHNOLOGICAL RISK
Material development and early production programs are subject
to uncertainties. Program managers who explicitly request funds to
address these uncertainties usually find these funds deleted
either in the DoD PP3S process, by OMB, or by Congress. Then when
such uncertainties occur, undesirable funding adjustments are re-
quired or the program must be delayed until the formal funding process
can respond with additional dollars.
The Army has initiated, and Congress has accepted, a Total Risk
Assessing Cost Estimate (TRACE) to explicitly address program un-
certainties in the development of RDT&E budget estimates. The Army
is studying the application of this concept to early production cost
estimates. The other Services lack a similar concept to justify
reserve funds for dealing with developmental uncertainties.
Recommendation : Increase DoD efforts to quantify risk and
expand the use of budgeted funds to deal with uncertainty. En-
courage all Services to use such budgeting where appropriate.
Advantages
:
Cost estimates will be more realistic over time.




Can encourage a more costly treatment of
problems that might be solved in other ways (self-fulfilling prophecy)
.
Higher initial program estimates would result in fewer programs
within a stated total obligation authority.
Action Required : SecDef emphasize the requirement to eval-
uate , ~q7ia!vtrfy~ancr"plan for risk. USDRE direct all Services to
budget funds for risk. In particular, each Service should review
the TRACE concept and either adopt it or propose an alternative




Idea Meeds More Development:






PROVIDE ADI-C-ATE FRONT ZND rUNDi:TG 70?. TgS^ :T.-. T,r"-T\ ? Z
Weapon system development programs often have too few test
acticles to allow parallel tests for performance, reliability,
etc., and in order to shorten development time without substantial!;.
increasing risks. Procurement of too few test articles forces a
sequential approach whereby the available test articles are
dedicated exclusively to development testing. Consequently,
operational and other testing cannot be accomplished concurrently
(within acceptable levels of risk) to save time.
In addition to designing for the major performance objectives,
increased emphasis should be placed on designing for reliability
by providing adequate design margins, while giving full considera-
tion to adequate testing, fault isolation and maintainability.
Adequate test hardware should be provided in the program to permit
early combined environmental tests of the subsystems and subsequent
3ystem tests, to allow iteration of the design using the test-fix
test process to achieve early design maturity.
Recommendation : Provide sufficient test hardware to meet
the subsystem, system and software engineers' needs to properly
engineer and test development of the end item hardware using
parallel testing to reduce overall schedule time. The number
of test articles must be defined and explained during preparation
of Service programs and budgets
.
Advantages : Saves time in the total acquisition process by
emphasizing reliability up front and eliminating lengthy and
costly problem identification and correction effort; also allows
realistic concurrent development and operational testing.
Disadvantages : Requires increased front end funding.
Action Required : USDRS ensure that the acquisition strategy
identify plans for and funding required to acquire adequate sub-
system and system test hardware to reduce overall schedule time
and risks.
Approved: &—~^
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GOVERNMENTAL LEGISLATION RELATED TO ACQUISITION
Over the past decade, the acquisition process has become
overburdened with governmental legislation and requirements.
Individually, these regulations have worthwhile objectives;
collectively, they impose a costly and burdensome requirement on
industry and the acquisition process.
Recommendation : Seek DoD relief from the more burdensome
requirements of governmental regulations.
Advantages : Less cost to contractors in doing business
with the Government. Reduce program costs. Simpler contracting
procedures. Faster contract awards.
Disadvantages : Reduced benefits which are considered impor-
tant national goals. Request for relief will certainly spark
debates with the various interested groups.
Action Required : USDR&E establish joint OSD and Service
team to weigh the impact of the various governmental require-
ments and regulations on the efficiency and effectiveness of the
total DoD acquisition and contracting process. Industry and OMB
should participate to the maximum extent possible. A report
should be prepared for the DepSecDef within 4 5 days.
Approved :
Idea Needs More Development:







REDUCE THE MUM3SP- OF OOP DIRECTIVES
The current acquisition directive refers to 114 (up from
15 in 1971 and 26 in 1977) related directives and instructions.
The Services emulate these directives in implementation with their
own implementing instructions. There is rarely a challenge to
these well-intentioned directions, nor is there a cost-benefit
check performed. Program manager and industry initiatives are
often stilted by overregulation. With each new directive addi-
tional paperwork, manhours and other direct costs are expended
in compliance. Congressional, 1A0, industry, OSD, and OF??
studies have indicated that contractually imposed management
systems and data requirements cost 9 cents out of every
contract dollar. With defense contracting approaching S10C
billion a year, it means that these management-imposed require-
ments cost approximately S3 billion per year. A 20% improve-
ment would save 5116 million per year.
Recommendation : Reduce the number of directives. Require
that the Defense Acquisition Executive be the sole issuer of DoD
directives related to acquisition. This would not mean that DAE
would draft all such documents, only that DAE would have final
review and releasing authority.
Advantages : Coordinates requirements and reduces the issuance
of superfluous directives. Will reduce program costs to the
extent that directives require reports, data, documentation.
Disadvantages : Adds an additional layer to the process of
issuing or revising a directive. ?laces the DAE in control of
directives for areas of acquisition for which he may have little
expertise.
Action Required : USDRE establish a joint OSD, Service, In-
dustry team to provide recommendations within 90 days to sub-





Idea Meeds More Develooment:






Program continuity requires that we budget for orocuremenr
funds more than a year in advance of the actual transition date
of major acquisition programs from R§D to procurement. Since
most development program schedules are success oriented, some-
times the procurement transition date arrives and the system
is not ready to buv. 3ecause procurement funds have been
budgeted, there is considerable pressure to proceed with pro-
duction rather than accept program delay. If the Secretary
(and/or Military Departments) had the authority to transfer
these procurement funds to RSD to correct deficiencies without
the prior approval of OMB and Congress, it could significantly
decrease the time involved in resolving program problems.
Section 734 of P.L. 96-527 (DoD Appropriation Act) provides a
general authority for Transfers, not to exceed S 7 50 million
between DoD appropriations. Its use requires a determination
by SecDef that such action is in the National Interest and
must have prior approval by OMB. Our current reprogramming
arrangements with the Congressional Oversight Committee pro-
vide that any such transfer is of "'special interest of the
Congress" and requires their nrior approval, in effect, negat-
ing the independent use of transfer authority by the Department
The proposal would require the support of the Oversight
Committees and OMB. Ideally, such approval should be included
in the general provisions of the Appropriations Act as a sub-
section of 734. We will have to work closely with Congress to
ensure that this authority would apply only to the movement of
funds programmed for an individual weapon system, and would
not be used to transfer funds between programs
.
Recommendation : Obtain legislative authority to transfer
individual weapon system Procurement funds to RDT5E.
Advantages : Provides DoD with more flexibility to resolve
weapon system funding deficiencies.
Avoids program delays associated with OMB/
Congressional review and approval of funding
adiustments
.
Maintains program stability by enabling pro-
gram manager to resolve problems within total






Disadvantages : 0K3/Congressional visibility occurs after
the fact.
Could jeopardize current appropriation
and authorization process.
Could jeopardize current reprogramming
arrangements with Congress.
May be destabilizing.
Action Required : ASD(C) , workinq with the General Counsel,
OMB and Congress establish procedures for ?oD approval of the
transfer of funds in a given fiscal year from Procurement to RDTSE
for an individual weapon system when the Secretary of Defense




Idea Meeds More Development:





CONTRACTOR INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND SUPPORT
Industry has said that even though there is recently more atten-
tion paid to "support" in DoD solicitations, there is a widespread
belief that performance and schedule are DoD's principal objec-
tives. There is a need for industry to apply more of their design
talents to reducing reliability and support problems. aeyor.d
this a need to improve the identification and specification of
maintenance manpower constraints and for industry to include
these constraints in the designs.
Recommendation
:
Acquisition strategies should identify the
approaches to incentivize contractor attainment of reliability
and maintainability (R&M) goals and reduce maintenance manpower
and skill levels. These should include the approach taken in
the RFP evaluation, as well as specific awards, incentives and
guarantees, such as specific rewards for improving reliability.
The Services should develop greater expertise in support related
contractor incentives through analysis of experience gained on
DoD programs.
Improvements should be developed in the method of projecting
critical maintenance manpower skill limitations and translating
these into design constraints and objectives for inclusion in
RFPs and specifications.
Advantages : Improves reliability and support. Reduces
maintenance manpower requirements
.
Disadvantages : Incentives other than competition require
additional funds.
Action Required : USDRE working with the Services, develop
guidelines to include the approaches to incentivize contractors
to improve support within 60 days, followed by a USDRE and
Service evaluation of incentives within the next year.
USDRE develop with the Services, within one year, improved
approaches to translate maintenance manpower skill projections
into system design objectives.
Approved: X (—
'
Idea Needs More Development:





DECREASE DSARC BRIEFING AMD DATA REQUIREMENTS
During recent years there has been a growing tendency to
centralize the decision process within the DoD. This practice
has multiplied throughout the numerous levels of authority in
each of the Services, and has complicated the review process.
This practice has, in and of irself, lengthened the acquisition
cycle; created cost increases due to delays in decisions; con-
fused the authority, responsibility and accountability of the
designated Services Managers; and has stifled innovation which
could produce program improvements leading to cost savings.




Emphasize the requirement to achieve
appropriate delegation of responsibility, authority and accounta-
bility to and within each Service for system acquisition to
reduce the time and effort required for DSARC and Service major
system reviews.
Advantages ; Reduced system cost and shorter acquisition
cycles. More efficient reporting by and within the Services.
More streamlined program management. More efficient DSARC
and other program reviews. Potential elimination of layered
management resulting in lean organizations.
Disadvantages : Some risk of losing a thorough functional
analysis of the system because of the elimination of more detailed
reviews.
Action .Required ; USDRE make explicit the changed character





Idea Needs More Development:





BUDGETING WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR INFLATION
Historically, inflation predictions have been lesser
than the actual inflation that come to pass. The situation
has been most severe in major weapon programs that spend out
slowly and extend into those years when inflation estimates
have been poorest. The result is that unpredicted inflation
has cut heavily into real program by as much as S6 or S7
billion a year. In addition to the serious underfunding of
major weapon and other purchases, DoD is charged with poor
management because of the amounts of cost growth in current
dollars appearing in reports and in the process.
Recommendation : Review various methods and alternatives
for budgeting more realistically for inflation.
Required Action : Comptroller and PA&E develop in more
detail the various alternatives addressing the inflation issue
as related to planning and budgeting for major acquisition
programs and provide a decision paper to the Deputy Secretary





Idea Needs More Development
:







FORECASTING 2? 3PSINSS5 3ASZ Z'.
MAJOR 3£"" v:3Z PLANTS
The business base at key defense plants is not adequately
considered in DoD program development. Cross -Service impacts and
the effects of non-DoD work distorts business base projections and
seriously increases overhead costs. This has caused large cost
growth for certain weapons systems . Too little consideration is
given to this factor in OoO planning and decision-making.
Recommendation : The Services will increase the effort to co-
ordinate programming information that affects other Service over-
head costs at given defense plants. Program offices will provide
program projections to plant representatives so that overall
business projections can be made available to the Services for
planning and budgeting.
Advantages : Better cost estimates and lower cost to the
government. Provides more realistic costs and stability.
Action Required : Contract Administration functions will be
directed to maintain a business base projection, and government
offices will be directed to support this effort and utilize these
data in planning and budgeting. The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement
Group (CAIG) will maintain a data exchange for the Services to




Idea Meeds More Development:






IMPROVE THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS
)
Some DoO competitively-selected contractors have performed
poorly. In some instances, source selection criteria do not
sufficiently take into account past performance or plans for
future phases of a program. Also, the credibility and realism
of contractor cost proposals are not always challenged.
Recommendation
;
ImDrove the source selection orocess to
place added emphasis on past performance, schedule realism,
facilitization plans and cost credibility. De-emphasize the
importance of lowest proposed cost. Devote more attention to
evaluating contractors ' performance during and at the time of
contract completion. Provide award fee contract structure to
encourage good performance. This both provides an incentive
for good performance, and a measure of contractor performance
to be used in future source evaluations. Establish quality
ratings where possible and ensure these past performance ratings
are available for use by source selection personnel.
Advantages : Eliminate poor performers , eliminate proposals
that are unrealistically priced, thereby reducing the risk of
buy- ins.
Disadvantages : May limit competition. Will be difficult to
implement and apply fairly.
Action Required : USDRE modify the source selection directive,
DoDD 4105.62, to emphasize the objectives stated above. USDRE




Idea Meeds More Development







DEVELOP AND USE STANDARD OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS
New subsystems and support: systems are developed chat are
peculiar to specific weapon systems, yet have many performance
features in common with other systems. Use of standard, off-
the-shelf subsystems and/or support systems for some of the long
lead time items can reduce development time.
Recommendation ; Identify and develop standard subsystems
and support systems or their technology (independent of weapon
systems) to meet projected weapon system needs. Support a
program of weapon support R&D to put diagnostic, repair, and
logistic technology on the shelf.
Advantages : Earlier deployment with lower risk. Enhanced
supportability . Reduction in operating costs.
Disadvantages : Standard systems or technology may not be
best match for zhe weapon system needs. Requires increased
funding to implement. Could be overemphasized.
Action Required : USDRE working with the Services submits
a proposed program for FY 32 and beyond within six months.
Approved : /y*—^
Idea Needs More Development:





PROVIDE MOPE APPROPRIATE DESIGN TO COST tqaLj
Design to Cost (DTC) fee awards are made as a result of
paper analysis. There is little or no tie to actual costs in
production. DTC incentive fees and awards are payable during
and at the conclusion of Full-scale Development. Award is based
on the forecasted average cost for the production quantity.
Recommendation : Provide appropriate incentives to industry
by associating fee awards to actual costs achieved during the
early production runs.
Advantages : Ties award to "real" achievement. Makes DTC
meaningful.
Disadvantages : Changes in program (rates, quantity, in-
flation, etc. ) ccmplicate analysis of results. Longer time
between DTC effort and award payment.
Action Required : Insure program managers and contracting
officers develop contract terms and procedures to provide for
the payment of Design to Cost (DTC) awards and incentives based
upon costs actually achieved during early production runs. Base
payments on demonstration that initial costs are on track with \




Idea Needs More Development: '







ASSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUI5ITIQM PROCESS DECISIONS
The acquisition process has been studied many times by many
organizations. Most of the recommendations presented here have zeer.
made before. However, few of these recommendations have been imple-
mented. Congress, GAO, OMB, 0F?P, industry, and OSD have continu-
ously criticized the Services for not following OODD 3000.1 and ZCDI
5000.2. A recent Navy acquisition study reviewed the implementation
3tatus of past acquisition process studies and found that of 50
recurrent recommendations, some progress is perceived to have occur-
red in 29 and almost no progress is perceived to have occurred in
the remainder.
A difficulty with implementing recommendations regarding -he
acquisition process is the great number of players involved to make
implementation succeed. This requires persistent, intensive, fol-
low-up effort to make sure that the recommendations reaiiy do take
hold. The most common reason for non- implementation is simply that
relentless action on the part of top management is not taken to
insure that recommendations are, indeed, implemented. OSD has, in
the past, focused a great amount of management attention on policy
development and resolution. However, OSD has not monitored imple-
mentation of the policies on a program basis.
Since potential decisions could lead to major changes to the
process and even to DoD organizations and their roles, it will be
difficult for the existing DoD organizations to execute changes
without high level attention by the SecDef and OepSecDef. Elimina-
tion of the complexity inherent in the current process is masxed
unless the many different types of changes are considered in terms
of the aggregate administrative and reporting load generated.
A fundamental determination which is required for each decision
is whether implementation should reflect centralized control under
OSD or decentralization to the Services. In selected areas a uni-
formity of action across Services may be desired.
Recommendation : Ensure that a determined management translates
approved recommendations into implementable direction and fixes
responsibility so that management has visibility of the actions
taken.
Advantages : This plan will not succeed without a well planned,
intensive, high visibility, relentless implementation phase. With-
out- this effort, this report will degenerate into another study.
Disadvantages : Implementation will require a priority and
time commitment rrom all levels of management ranging from the
SecDef to the Program Manager for a number of years.
Action Required : a. Assign overall responsibility to 'JSDRE
for monitoring and rollow-up of all decisions made in this report.
b. USDRE will assign a prime responsibility
for action on every recommendation and decision in this report. In
general, these assignments have been specified under the "Action
Required" sections; however, in certain cases specific action res-
ponsibilities will be defined in the immediate future.
134

c. USDRE should consider utilizing a working
group containing OSD and Service representatives to assist in :mple- ~\
mentation. J
d. USDRE should consider utilizing a number
of creative techniques to translate the intent of these recommenda-
tions to all levels. This could include formal training sessions,
conferences, video taped training films, articles, and policy letters.
e. Both the SecDef and the DepSecDef must
maintain a personal interest in ensuring that the changes are imple-
mented, that there is continuous action to improve the acquisition
process, that periodic reviews take place, and that all Services and












MAJOR issoes ecr zzcisio::
This section presents for decision the major issues identi-
fied in the Defense Systems Acquisition °eview.
A. Issue : WHAT SHOULD BE THE SECDEF (DSARC) DECISION MILESTONES?
The current process provides four discrete SecDef decision
points. All of the alternatives discussed below retain "he
current "milestone" process structure. However, all alterna-
tives either de-emphasize or reduce the number of formal GSD
level milestone reviews and SecDef decisions. Under some
alternatives certain milestone reviews are delegated to the
Service Secretaries. The Secretary of Defense decision author-
ity and acquisition policy responsibilities are maintained and
exercised through the ?PSS process and/or by invoking explicit
disapproval of proposed Service program acquisition decisions
at any stage in the cycle. There are four alternatives shown
schematically on page
Alternative One (Page D-ll) reduces the current four discrete
SecDef decision milestones to three (with flexibility for only
two) by altering Milestone Zero.
Milestone Zero SecDef review and decision is accomplished through
the annual Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PP3S)
.
Although Milestone I is retained, a SecDef decision would gen-
erally be necessary only when a program requires a significant
prototype (Advanced Development) phase. When held. Milestone I
documentation would be reduced.
Milestone II and III reviews would continue to be conducted by
the DSARC with final approval action by the SecDef. Any pre-
or post-Milestone III reviews deemed necessary would be held at
the Service level except under unusual circumstances.
- Pro: - Reduced administrative burden.
Increased flexibility
- Initial development program reviews and
decisions are speeded.
Con: - May be perceived as a lessining of SecDef
control.
Alternative Two (Page D-16) reduces the number of formal SecDef
DSARC reviews to Milestones II and III.
Milestone would be reviewed by OSD during PP3S as in
Alternative One above.
Milestone I would be delegated to the Service Secretaries.
SecDef authority and oversight is maintained through notifica-




Milestones II and III receive a full DSARC review and DSARC approval,
Pro: - Further delegation of program responsibility and
reduction in administrative burden.
Front-end process is speeded as in Alternative One.
Con: - Further reduction in SecOef control over acquisi-
tion of major programs at front-end; may restrict
SecDef ability to redirect due to program momentum.
May not be considered proper implementation of
A-109 with regard to Milestone I (A-109 requires
SecDef to retain decision authority at the four
Milestone Decisions).
Alternative Three (Page D-19) reduces the SecDef decision mile-
stones to two, but ensures full SecDef involvement in ma^or program
initiation, and improved program definition for program go-ahead.
The first decision point, "Requirements Validation: (equivalent
to combination of Zero and One) , serves as a full DSARC/SecDef
review and approval of major program initiation including threat,
weapons concept, risk and schedule, readiness, and affordability
goals. At this point a specific "not-to-exceed" dollar threshold
is established which sets the funding to carry the program through
Concept Validation and early Full-Scale Development activity up to
the second decision point, "Full-Scale Development and Production."
The goals to be achieved by, and the timing of the second SecDef
decision point are defined at the first decision point.
The Program Go-Ahead, second SecDef decision point, occurs some-
what later than Milestone II in a "normal" program schedule, and
it is selected to coincide with Preliminary Design Review. SecDef
retains source veto/disapproval of a Service proposed action and
program plans which shall include Full-Scale Development and Pro-
duction, the program plan for Test and Evaluation, Support and
Readiness, and the total acquisition strategy.
The production program review is delegated to the Service Secretary
if there are no major changes to the program approved at the second
decision point by the SecDef.
Pro: - The administrative burden is reduced by fewer
OSD level reviews.
The review levels are linked more closely to
major expenditure increases.
Program commitment is delayed until program
technical, performance and cost factors are
more accurately determined.
Provides more efficient transition between
development and production.
Con: - Same Cons as above; in addition the divergence
from A-L09 language is more acute.






B. Issue : SHOULD MENS BE ELIMINATED/REVISED?
Problem : The Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) is an
internal DoD document used to support the SecDef decision at
Milestone 0. The MENS is required by DoD implementation of
0MB Circular A-109 (1976) requirements to state needs in terms
of mission and that SecDef should certify the need. The MENS
was to be 5 pages or less. In practice staffing has increased
and detailed justification information often requested by OSD
has contributed directly to perceptions of growth in the
"front end" of the acquisition cycle. There are 30 MENS
currently approved.
Alternative One would require submission of the MENS (shortened
or as currently required) no later than with the Service POM
thus linking the acquisition and PPBS process. SecDef approval
of MENS would be by accepting POM in the absence of specific
disapproval.
Pro: - Consistent with reduced SecDef review options.
- Better integration of acquisition and PPBS
processes as "new starts" would be reviewed
in the context of the full Service/DoD budget
formulation process.
- SecDef decision authority retained, but
exercised by exception in the budget process.
Con: - Some reduction in SecDef visibility and
influence over preliminary program plans.
Alternative Two would eliminate MENS document entirely;
Congressional Descriptive Summary (and other POM documenta-
tion already required) would document Milestone 0.
- Pro: - Reduced paperwork, simplified program
documentation.
Con: - MENS has been given considerable visibility
in OPPP, 0MB, and GAO, could be viewed as
circumvention of A-109 though MENS not
specifically required by A-109 .
Action Required : USDRE revise DoD Directive 5000.1/DoD









C. Issue : SHOULD DSARC MEMBERSHIP BE REVISED?
Problem : Service Secretaries have statutory responsibility for
the execution of contractual and financial responsibilities for
their departments, yet they are not voting members of the DSARC.
Service Chiefs also have no vote although they will be respon-
sible for developing and operating the systems under consideration.
Alternative One would maintain current membership. (USDRE,
Chairman; USDP; ASD(C); ASD(MRA&L); ASD(PAiE); Chairman, JCS
;
plus others in special cases).
Pro: - Retains DSARC as a SecDef staff advisory council.
Con: - Could place the DSARC in a position of recommend-
ing a position that is contradictory to that of
the Service line executive responsible to the
SecDef without explicitly reflecting the Service
position.
Alternative Two would include the appropriate Service Secretary
or Service Chief as full members of DSARC.
Pro: - Provide SecDef with a broader advisory council.
Reduces adversary nature of current procedure.
Con: - Reduce the independence of the DSARC as OSD
advisor to SecDef.
Increases the size of the DSARC.









Alternative Four (Page 0-24) eliminates all SecDef decision
milestones and delegates total program review responsibility
to the Service Secretaries. The DSA.RC could be invoked at
SecDef discretion but generally the SecDef would exercise con-
trol and decision authority on a by-exception veto/ disapproval
basis. Milestone Zero would be conducted through the PP3S
process as described earlier.
Pro: - This alternative goes the furthest toward
decentralization and reduction in adminis-
trative burden.
Con: - SecDef direct control of major acquisitions is
substantially reduced. Perceived violation of
the intent of A-109 as regards agency head
responsibility .
Action : USDRE revise DoD Directives 5000.1/2 appropriate to
alternative selected.
Decision:





(Three SecDef Milestone Decisions)
(Two SecDef Milestone Decisions)
(Two SecDef Milestone Decisions)















)D. Issue : WHO SHOULD BE THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE (DAE)?
Problem : Current policy requires that a DAE be designated by
the SecDef to be the principal advisor and staff assistant for
the acquisition of defense systems and equipment. The 'JSDRE is
designated the DAE. However, the scope of the function en-
compasses procurement of material to support and sustain the
force. There is continuing competition between modernization
readiness, maintenance of forces and sustainability . The 'J3DRE
has primary staff responsibility for force modernization efforts
of DoD.
Alternative One would retain rJSDRE as the DAE.
Pro: - The USDRE is clearly the OSD executive with the
greatest technical knowledge and systems devel-
opment expertise.
Con: - Primary USDRE responsibility is developing
weapon systems as opposed to operating, main-
taining, or supporting the military force.
The effort to rationalize and fund competing
programs suffers because USDRE could be an
R&D proponent himself.
Alternative Two would designate DepSecDef as DAE.
Pro: - Improved balance between modernizing and oper-
ating the force and a more coherent defense
program could result from having DepSecDef
chair both the DRB and the DSARC.
-• Con: - Increases the levei of DepSecDef involvement in
the acquisition process. USDRE is the DSD









E. Issue : WHAT 3HCUL0 3E THE CRITERION FOR SYSTEMS REVIEWED 3Y
DSARC?
Problem: Currently, there are over 50 major programs designated
for DSARC review. Although dollar thresholds (currently $icO M
RDT&E or S500M procurement in FY 1980 S) are "guidelines," they
are generally the rule of thumb used to select major programs.
Major program designation is derived by subjective -udgment based
upon joint Service participation, estimated funding, manpower and
support requirements, risk, politics, and other Secretary of
Defense interests.
Alternative One would continue present system.
•
- Pro: - The current system allows flexibility in
designation, and does not force uncontentious
programs to become major strictly because of
large investment.
Con: - The largely subjective criteria causes un-
certainty, and may be susceptible to an
arbitrary designation.
Alternative Two increases dollar guidelines for major system
designation to $2Q0M RDT&E and $1B procurement in ?Y 80 S.
Pro: - The number of Service DSARCs and DSARC would
be reduced approximately 25% while still
insuring review of the most expensive major
systems.
Uncertainty and the opportunity for arbitrary,
unnecessary designation are reduced.
Con: - Reduces number of major systems of significant
investment not reviewed at Secretary of
Defense level.
Action Required : USDRE revise DoD Directive 5000.1/DoD










P. Issue: HOT'? SHOULD THE DSARC/PPBS DECISION 3E INTEGRATED?
Problem : It has been the perception that a DSARC endorsement
and subsequent SccDef approval commits the SecDef/Service to
fund the program as approved. This has led to confusion as to
program status and stability. The DSARC process reviews single
programs at significant milestones to determine readiness to
proceed to the next phase. It is not feasible in that :onzaxt
to assess the financing of a ma^or program vis a vis other
Defense requirements. In contrast, the ?P3S addresses all
programs within a resource allocation framework without an
in-depth review of technical issues and program structure.
This "disconnect," the lack of explicit resource commitment
(including support and manpower) resulting from a successful
DSARC review and subsequent SecDef approval, is frequently cited
as a flaw in the acquisition process.
Alternative One continues present practice.
Pro: - Allows funding decisions during POM/budget
development.
Con: - Fosters program instabilities when DSARC program
is not supported in PP3S cycle.
May void contract with industry.
Alternative Two resolves the interface problems by providing that
programs reviewed by the DSARC will be accompanied by assurance
that sufficient agreed to resources are in the FYDP and EPA or
can be programmed to execute the program as recommended. DSARC
review would certify the program ready to proceed to the next
acquisition stage. Af fordability in the aggregate would be a
function of the PPBS process.
Pro: - This would lead to DSARC endorsement of fiscally
executable programs and fosters program
stability through resource commitment.
Con: - Funding constraints may be set without regard to
technical issues.
Alternative Three has the DRB assume the functions of the DSARC.
This also makes DepSecDef the Acquisition Executive.
Pro: - Decisions made by single body; no need to
revisit in another forum.
Forges a closer linkage between the acquisition
process and the PPQS
.




Action Required: Alternative 2--DAE enforce current DoD
Directive *5000.i af fordability policy and (JSDRE revise 5000.:
to strengthen policy and eliminate confusion.
Alternative 3— (JSDRE revise DoD Directive











G. Issue: PROGP.AM MANAGER CONTROL OVER LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT
RESOURCES
Problem : Three proaramming and budgeting problems are disin-
centives for program managers to provide system support and
readiness
.
1. Support program and budget requirements are based on
experience related measures (unrelated to readiness) instead
of a system's support requirements and readiness factors.
2. Budget review by appropriation categories. The fielding
of a. weapons system involves several appropriations: P.S2,
procurement, military construction, operation and maintenance
and military personnel. Normally budget decisions in these
accounts occur without visibility of the impact on individual
system's support or readiness.
3. 3udget execution. Some weapon support funds (spares,
training, depot) are controlled by Service activities not
responsible to the program manager. Sometimes priorities do
not match the program manager's and funds are diverted to fund
other requirements.
The Program Manager may not toiow of or participate in PP9S
decisions which impact on his system's support. Once decisions
are made on his system's support, they may be altered by an-
other activity during budget execution. This is particularly
critical early in FSED as well as during the transition to pro-
duction when large initial support resources are spent. At any
given time, there would be an estimated 15-20 weapons total
involved in transition. Procurement of spares with contracts
separate from the system production contract increases spares
costs.
OPTIONS: Alternatives 2 and 3 below would apply to selected
weapon systems, those nearing production or in early production
{15-20 systems) . A two year trial is recommended for the
selected alternative.
Alternative One would continue present management system (use
traditional/experience related measures to review system support
program and budget requirements; review budget by appropriation
categories.
Pro: - Mo cost of change.
Con: - Disincentives for program manager to provide
system support readiness remain. 3udget review
and budget execution problems are not addressed.






Alternative Two would nave Services submit with the POM support
resource requirements and readiness objectives, by weapon system,
for systems entering/or in early production. direct OSO to have
a single review of support associated with individual systems.
Pro ;
Gives more PP3S visibility of the combined effects Of ma3or
support decisions on readiness objectives.
Removes PP3S disincentives by reducing independent budget,'
PPBS decisions without visibility of effect on program as a
whole.
Would move in the direction of a more mission oriented budget
decision process.
Con :
Some extra work for the reviewers.
Alternative Three - is the same as two but would additionally de-
velop procedures to give the PM more control of support resources,
funding and execution. Services would develop implementing
approaches to deal with the problems identified on this issue.
The basic option should give the Program Manaaer a voice in support
resource allocation and budget execution process through in-
creased and centralized resource visibility and coordination by
the PM on changes to his' plans.
Pro:
Giving the Program Manager a voice (or coordination) in major
support resource decisions for his program would improve re-
sponsibility.
Con :
A moderate step requires procedural changes and may or may not
be effective- More direct control of many resources would un-
balance the overall use of logistic resources by the Service.
Action Required : ASD(MRASL) letter to Services stating objectives
to give more incentives to ?M. ASD(MRA*L; would work with the
Services to define and evaluate implementing options. Initial
letter can be prepared within 30 days.
Decision : Alternative 1
Alternative 2
Alternative 3"








In response to serious readiness and reliability prob-
lems ir. many of the systems we now operate, there have been
increases in Service and OSD efforts to define reliability and
support objectives and to demonstrate their accomplishment prior
to major production commitment. Recent acquisition policies
include this increased emphasis.
The new focus on shortening the development process is poten-
tially in conflict with initiatives to improve reliability and
support . Whereas the fastest acquisition approach involves
initiating production prior to test of development models, the
highest confidence of achieving reliability and other support
goals in fielded hardware involves iterative design and testing
before high rate production. A balance must be struck on each
program. Many of the serious problems in current systems
result from not striking the correct balance.
For those systems which are run on a fast track, there are re-
quirements for additional early funding to design in reliability
and support characteristics - including the need to pay this
price in parallel or competing developments. Additional m-house
talent must be brought to bear, and industry incentives need to
be applied to avoid previously experienced support problems.
Because of the relative priority of reliability and support
efforts compared to performance objectives, and the current
shortage of in-house talent to address these problems, specific
top management attention, priority and stress on support re-
sources is needed.
Alternative One modifies the current acquisition procedures to
require a specific early decision (circa Milestone 1 on many
programs) on the approach, additional resources and incentives
which will be used to balance the risks in the reliability and
support area on each program. The vehicle for decision can ae
an acquisition strategy prepared by the Program Manager. This
should include an option which goes as far as possible in extra
efforts (design, parallel testing, contractual) to increase the
likelihood of achievement of support objectives on concurrent
programs
.
Pro: - Early decision on degree of concurrency sets in
motion long lead steps to reduce support risks.
Results in conscious decision to balance all the
objectives in the light of Service and DoD
priorities.
Gets additional early resource needs considered.




Con: - Will require rare up- front funds. Will be
viewed by some as addressing support too early.
Additional responsibility for PM (but the
clear decisions may be helpful).
Alternative Two shifts more of the focus to fixincj reliability
and support problems experienced in fielding the system by
subsequent redesign of production hardware and incorporation o:
fixes. Rely more on interim contractor support while problems
are being fixed.
Pro: - Easier to do.
Leaves program manager freer to make the
trade-off.s without Service involvement.
Con: - Requires more funds to fix later. Historically
difficult to get funds for major fixes. Less
likelihood of avoiding support problems.
Congress will criticize the early fielding
problems.
Action Required (If Alternative One is selected) : USDRE issue
guidance adding early assessment of support options to the
current procedures. This could be part of a decision on over-
all acquisition strategy. Additionally request the Services
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JP§rrrP^, P ^ , J- THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20301
March 27, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE ..
GENERAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANTS TO -THE SECRETARY. OF DEFENSE'
SUBJECT: Management of the DOD Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System
On 13 February 1931, I directed a 30-day assessment of
the DOD PPSS. The report was delivered to me on 13 March 1902 -
I have discussed it with the Steering Group, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Service Secretaries, the Under Secretaries and
selected Assistant Secretaries- Your interest, frankness and
professionalism during these discussions have convinced me
that we have a unique opportunity to improve significantly
the way we do our planning and manage our resources.
Based on the report and those conversations, the
Secretary and I have decided on the following approacJi.
DoD Management Philosophy
The Defense management system will focus on the major
missions that the Department of Defense roust address to
satisfy national objectives:
— It will define the national military strategy necessa.y
to support our foreign policy and provide security fo~
our people.
— It will help us achieve the integrated and balanced
military forces determined by the Secretary to be
necessary to accomplish that strategy.
— It will help assure that we are significantly ready
in all aspects to deter aggression and to succeed
where armed intervention is necessary.
—
— It will provide the framework necessary to manage the
Defense resources effectively and to insu re successful




~ It will provide information to the Secretary to help
him insure that the role of military power is properly
considered in the formulation of national objectives.
Decentralization and Accountability
We will achieve better Defense management by working
toward a system of centralized control of executive policy
direction and more decentralized policy execution. Working
with the Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and OSD staff, the Secretary and I will concentrate
on major policy decisions, definition of planning goals and
,the* allocation" of. resources necessary to strengthen the hori-
zontal integration of our four Services into a balanced Armed
Forces Team to meet our national military strategy. To support
these policies and plans, we will held each of the Service
Secretaries responsible for the development and execution of
the necessary programs and the day-to-day management of the
resources under their control. Through th?j? r""+-mi "jpd
decentralization, subordinate line executives will be held
accountable for the execution of our approved programs and
policy decisions. This will focus Service management efforts
on improving the operational efficiency of each department.
This general principle, however, ha3 two major corollaries.
First, va must assure that accountability is specifically fixed,
and that an improved process is available for DOD-wide perfor-
mance evaluation and monitoring. Those who have the responsi-
bility will be held fully accountable for results. T expect
strong leadership and initiative by the civilian and military
executives at all levels of the Department of Defense. They
must manage well and assure that both the Secretary and I are
kept informed on a continuous basis of major problems and
issues before they surface in forums outside DOD.
Secondly, this concept must contain appropriate procedures
and levers to assure that Department-wide, cross-Service and
cross-command programs are planned, managed and evaluated.
There must be sufficient flexibility to assure that Presidential
and Secretary of Defense goals and priorities are recognized,
met and maintained by the Services and line organizations.
Examples include our nuclear forces, C 3 I, DOD-wide manpower
policies, mobility forces and others that cut acros;: individual
Service lines.
My staff managers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
will be responsible for providing the technical cro::o-Service
mission analysis and evaluations necessary to insurn that our
actions effectively integrate the capabilities of the Services.
In addition, through their review of program execution within
the departments, OSD staff will provide to the E*»rret?iry and





A second major management principle that both the Secretary
and I espouse and expect to utilize fully is that -11 those that
have a legitimate interest in the outcome of a management deci-
sion should participate in the decision. There art: many different
internal points of view on major issues and legitimately so. We
want to assure that these positions are fully articulated at the
appropriate level. We also encourage dissent. '.7e must all have
the courage of our convictions and express them prior to the
time of decision. Once the Secretary and I have made the policy
decisions, however, we insist on full support in the implementa-
tion of those decisions.
This participative principle pertains not only to the OSD-
Service relationship and internally within both CSD and the
Services, but cross-Service as well. On the latter point, I
would like more cross-Service dialogue to take place on major
program development and implementation issues regardless of
whether OSD staff initiates the process. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, as well as the CIWCs, could initiate such dialogue.
Alternatively, the Services, with their enhanced authority and
responsibility, could acknowledge and move forward on DoD-wide
opportunities that cut across Service lines.
Economies and Efficiencies
We all, as part of our management responsibility, have to
assure that the large amount of funds being proposed for Defense
are used wisely, effectively and efficiently. We must be more
aggressive and imaginative in saving money by eliminating major
overlaps or duplications and assigning priorities to all programs.
I look to each of you to use your enhanced authority to bring
about major savings and improved methods of operation. During
the programming and budgeting process, we must be straight-
forward with each other in looking for economies and efficien-
cies if our new management system is to work. I expect to
enforce the necessary discipline during the entire process.
Game playing will not be tolerated. We should all remember
that if we do not produce some real savings and lower costs
in many programs, others will do it for us.
Specific Decisions
In order to assure we follow the management principles and
meet the policy objectives I have stated above, I am directing
that the following actions take place, effective today.
Improved Planning
I agree with the consensus that we must both improve
strategic planning in the early planning phase of the TPDS cycle
and strengthen long-range planning throughout the other phases of
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the PPBS. This calls for a more disciplined planning process
that will provide the framework, the goals and objectives, the
appropriate military strategies, and the risks associated with
the optimum allocation of available resources. They, in turn,
should be based on military requirements that flow from a
realistic assessment of near-tera and long-term threats. The
major issues that will arise in the programming phase and the
major budgetary decisions that follow will be measured against
these planning goals and threats, not only against available
budgetary resources as in the past.
This improved planning process should address the larger
strategic issues and problems facing the country. Resource
constraints are an important part of this strategic planning
activity. But we should not allow the strategic planning
process to be too narrowly constrained by fiscal and program
guidance. We need the correct balance to assure realistic,
serious, and pragmatic strategic planning.
Therefore, to achieve this new planning policy, I direct
that USD (Policy) , with strong input f.com JCS and RS.E Resource
Planning, take the lead in designing zhLs new and improved
planning approach with inputs as necessary from other OSD
staffs, the Services and the CINCs. .: would like a detailed
plan of action on how we should proceed within 30 days. ^
Improved Programming
In accordance with this contxollt.-d decentralization
principle, the Services will have enhanced responsibility for
developing, defending, and carrying out their programs. OSD
staffs, as I have discussed above, will concentrate more on
major DoD policy, planning and prograii issues, primarily those
that cut across Service lines and programs and those that are
of priority Presidential and Secretary of Defense interest.
OSD will, with help from the Services, design and plan for
additional standardization, joint proc rams and joint systems,
to improve efficiency and reduce cost:.. I hope and expect
the Services to join in this effort.
The OSD function becomes at the lame time more difficult
and more critical. OSD must help the Secretary and me manage
the organization as a whole and help us identify major problems
and issues in the total system in time to act.
During this immediate FY 9 3-87 programming phase and
thereafter, all participants should bt: guided by the manage-
ment principles enunciated above and be responsible for the
following assignments:
Lead Office s In Coordination With
1. Overall Policy, Strategy, USD/P JCS, Services, CINCs,










6w Program Review and
Evaluation
Consistency with policy










































All of OSD, Services
As a first task, I would like each OSD lead office to provide
to bs a very brief paper, in 10 days, on how it would carry out
its responsibilities for these assignments. Include your suggest-
ions on how you plan to reduce substantially the information
requirement of the POM preparation instruction nd the budget
estimate submission. Our objective will be to develop a POM that
focuses primarily on major planning and policy issues.
I am setting the goal of cutting by at least 50 percent the
POM documentation requirements associated with thu current cycle
(POM 83) . It is my understanding that the response to the FY 82
POM requirements and instructions produced in one case, 2,691 pages
of text and tables. Surely we can get by with half that, particularly
if we begin to follow our new management principles. ASD (PA&E)
should review the F¥ 83-37 POM preparation instructions and provide
me a recommendation in 10 days on modifications that can be made to
achieve the 50 percent reduction goal.
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The Services also should be streamlining their internal pro-
gramming and budgeting procedures. They should focus specifically
on how they will provide the OSD staff and me the essential infor-
mation we need to carry out our responsibilities. At a future
date, I will ask the Services for a briefing and a progress report
on how well they are doing.
Change of Role and Membership of the DR 3
The DR3 was established in April 1379 to help improve the
efficiency of the PPBS, primarily by supervising the OSD review
of Service POMs and the Budget Submission. I am now directing
that the DRB role and membership be changed as follows:
DRB-Membefqniii
Chairman: DepSecDef
Executive Secretary: The Executive Assistant to DepSecDef
Permanent Members: ASD(RSE)
Chairman, JCS ASD (HA) Associate Director/OMB
SecArny ASD (MRA&L)
SecSavy ASD (PAS.E)




The primary role of DRB is to help the Secretary of Defense
manage the entire revised planning, programming and budgeting
process. I plan to hold regular monthly DRB meetings and more
•often if necessary, to review proposed planning guidance; to manage
the program and budget review process; to advise the Secretary of
Defense on policy, planning, program and budget issues and proposed
decisions; to perform program evaluations and reviews of high
priority programs on a regular basis; and to assure that major
acquisition systems are more closely aligned to PP3S.
I expect a limited number of major issues to be raised before
the DRB. Lesser issues should be decided outside the DRB forum
by consensus between the Services and appropriate OSD staff and
recorded by appropriate decision documents. In all cases, the
consensus must reflect Departmental and Administration policy.
Where consensus cannot be reached, the issue will be referred to
the DRB. I also expect full coordination of DRB decision papers
well before DRB meetings.
DRB members must be more than advocates of their particular
areas of responsibility; they must take a broader and deeper DoD





The PPBS report on this subject concluded that the costs of
implementing ZBB fur outweighed the beneficial results. Examples
were given of the tremendous amount of staff time and paper used,
with little effective value- I agree with these findings.
Therefore, I direct the Comptroller to begin the process of
reducing the negative effects of the ZBB process on our PPBS
oeginnir.g now with the Fl' 83-87 cycle. I would like a detailed
plan on how we can do this effectively and with minimum disloca-
tions for my approval within 10 days. Please coordinate the
detailed proposal with OMB. The idea of reexamining the necessity
and desirability of continuing each program is a good one. The
process by which we have done this is not:
Rationalization of Data Requirements
The move toward controlled decentralization and the assign-
ment of more responsibility to the Services raises a number of
issues on the level of detailed data formerly needed by OSD for
centralized analysis and control. In keeping with this management
philosophy, we will have to look to the Services to maintain an
adequate data bank not only to manage and execute their programs
but also to keep the Secretary and OSD informed. I expect that
access by CSD will be as required to resolve issues and will be
freely provided by the Services. OSD will continue to maintain
those centralized data banks that are mandated by statute or
necessary to support the Secretary in cross-Service analysis.
The use of that data by OSD must chan.e. OSD should exercise
its access not to provide an alternative detailed analysis of
Service programs but to provide the necessary joint program,
cross-Service, and Secretarial priority program analysis, review
and evaluation. This of course does not preclude suggesting
alternatives should this be desirable; but the development and
presentation of alternatives is the responsibility of line manage-
ment in the first instance.
I want to assure we have a better definition of this complex
issue on level of detail, data banks and categorical formats. In
addition, I want to reduce further the paperwork in the PPBS and
to begin to rationalize the usage of the many varieties of cate-
gories and data bases required internally and externally.
To do this, I direct that a study be mounted to develop a
more consistent framework of data bases and to reduce the level
of data required among OSD and the Services. An inter-OSD-Service
team led by the Comptroller as chairman should do an in-depth
problem analysis and array options for cutting down the massive
data requirements. Please include the OMB and legislative require-




We should begin to move toward the improved PPBS immedi-
ately. I direct USD (Policy) to prepare drafr. FY 1983-87
policy guidance, PA&E and Comptroller to prepare draft fiscal
guidance and USD(RiZ) and MRA&L to prepare draft resource
objectives and planning guidance within 10 d.:ys. DSD (Policy)
should take the overall lead to pull th* ent re draft policy
guidance package together and distribute it . or review to all
appropriate OSD and Service staffs. I then ._xpect to hold
the first meeting of the newly reconstituted DRB to review
and approve the draft policy and fiscal guidance.
I expect a significantly reduced PCM to De prepared
by the Services by 15 June 1901.
The Secretary and I, in consultation with the Director
of 0MB, have decided that the joint 0M3/0SD budget review
will be continued. The precise form and nature of this
review w 1 1 3 be developed with 0MB in the next several veeki.
I will regularly review progress toward achieving this
new revised PPBS. As we go through the FY 8 3 process and
begin the FY 84. planning, I will keep open the options of
a biennial POM and combined program-budget review in the
next cycle. Much will depend on our progress this year.
DoD Performance Review Process
The Secretary and I will soon be instituting a strong
management review process through which goals, objectives,
and milestones will be established and regularly reviewed
by the Secretary and me for each major program.
I appreciate the time and" interest you have provided
during this review. Achieving ' the goals the Secretary and
I have set will not be easy and will take time. The Secretary
and I expect and know we will receive your full cooperation
and your personal leadership over time to achieve our joint





EVOLUTION OF OSD INFLATION ESTIMATES
Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively reflect the historical
evolution of the Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates
for inflation used in the computation of the current, then
year, estimates of development, procurement, and military con-
struction cost. The historical estimates of inflation are not
corrected for actual inflationary experience during past years.
The estimate for inflation, for each past year, used in the
computation of the current estimate is the last estimate that
Office of the Secretary of Defense issued for that year.
Since the fiscal year 1982 budget was being prepared for
submission in December of 1980, the estimate of inflation used
for the budget year and all future program years was that
Office of the Secretary of Defense estimate issued in December,
1980, (i.e. the current estimate of future inflation.) The
source for these data was the F/A-18 Selected Acquisition
Reports
.
For example, note that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense estimate of the inflation of F/A-18 development cost
(Table 3) for 1979 was initially 4.0 percent, but was last
estimated to be 7.0 percent. The 7.0 percent estimate for
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METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATION OF F/A-18




Program Funding (Escalated $)
a. Current § Prior Years - Enter the program funding
amounts in escalated or "actual" dollars for each fiscal year
(FY) prior to the Budget Year. Their sum should equal the
amount shown under column 4 on Format E of the SAR. (The
SAR's are not included in this appendix because of security
classification; however, they are available from the Naval Air
Systems Command and from Congressional sources.)
b. Budget Year 5 FYDP through to Complete - Enter the
program funding amounts in escalated dollars for each fiscal
year shown under the "Current Estimate" column on Format H of
the SAR.
c. Total - Enter the total program funding (this
appropriation) in escalated dollars. This amount is the sum
of all entries in the "Program Funding (Escalated $)" row. It
should equal the amount shown under column 8 on the Format E
of the SAR.
2 Program Funding (Base Year $)
a. Current § Prior Years
(1) Base Year to Budget Year - Enter the base
year dollars for each FY from the Base Year to the Budget Year
b. Budget Year 5 FYDP through to Complete - Enter the
base year dollars for each fiscal year from the Budget Year
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to program completion. Each FY dollar amount should equal
the Current Estimate FYxx minus Escalation Amount FYxx shown
on Format H of the SAR.
c. Total - Enter the total program funding (this
appropriation) in base year dollars. This amount is the sum
of all entries in the "Program Funding (Base Year $)" row.
It should equal the amount shown under column 3 on Format E
of the SAR plus pre-base year escalation shown in the "Foot-
note" of the SAR, where applicable.
5. Program Escalation
a. Current § Prior Years - Enter the amount of es-
calation "Program Funding (Escalated $)" minus "Program Fund-
ing (Base Year $)" for each fiscal year (FY). Do not make any
adjustments for pre-base year dollars in this row.
b. Budget Year § FYDP through to Complete - Enter the
amount c escalation "Program Funding (Escalated R)" minus "Pro
gram Funding (Base Year $)" for each FY. The values in each
FY should equal those shown under "Escalation Amount" on
Format H of the SAR.
c. Total - Enter the total program escalation amount
(this appropriation) . This amount is the sum of all entries
in the "Program Escalation" row. It should equal the total
appropriation escalation entry shown under the Escalation or
Remarks columns on Format G.l (Cost Variance Analysis chart)
of the SAR plus the pre-base year escalation shown in the
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"Footnote" of the SAR, where applicable. As a double check,
it should also equal the total (this appropriation) from
column 8, Format E, minus the base year $ total (this appro-
priation) from column 3, Format E, minus the pre-base year
escalation shown in the "Footnote" of the SAR, where applicable
4. Annual Escalation Rate - These rates should be the
annual rates used to develop the "Composite Escalation Index"
that lets you change between program "Escalated" dollars and
"Base Year" dollars. EXCEPTION: FY7T is a "periodic" rate
(e.g., quarterly). If necessary, adapt format to reflect
Service peculiar instructions for handling the "transition"
year
.
a. Current § Prior years - Enter the program's annual
escalation rate for each fiscal year (FY) . These should be
the annual rates used to develop the "Composite Escalation
Index" for the Budget Year .
b. Budget Year $ FYDP through to Complete - Enter
j the program's annual escalation rate for each FYDP fiscal year.
These rates should equal the rates shown under "Escalation
Rate" on Format H of the SAR.
5. Compound Escalation Index - Develop a compound esca-
lation index using the program's "Annual Escalation Rated."
;Assign the program base year a value of 1.000. Enter the







FY78 (Base Year) 5.60
FY79 6.00
FY80 6.20
Generic example (not F/A-18 Data)
Compound
Index
0.885 = .947 ; 1.07
0.947 = 1.000 | 1.056
1.000
1.060 = 1.000 x 1.060
1.126 = 1.060 x 1.062
6. Outlay Rates - Enter the program's outlay rate (some
times called expenditure rate) as a percent for each fiscal
year (FY) . These rates should be the outlay rates used to
develop the "Composite Escalation Index:" this permits a




Outlay FY FY FY
Year 197T 1978 1979
PPN FY 2 19 10
FY+1 27 36 36
FY+2 56 29 39
FY+3 11 8 8
FY + 4 3 6 6
FY + 5 1 2 1
TOTAL 100% 100% 100
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7. Composite Escalation Index - Enter the program's
Composite Escalation Index (sometimes called outlay-weighted
index) for each fiscal year (FY) . The Composite Escalation
Index results from the mathematical combination of the pro-
gram's "Compound Escalation Index" and "Outlay Rates."
Example: Composite Escalation Index (FY 1977).
FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY85 TOTAL
Compound
Escalation
Rate 1.000 1.060 1.126 1.227 1.334 1.414




0.190 0.360 0.290 0.180 0.060 0.020 1.000
Composite
Escalation 0.190 + 0.382 + 0.327 + 0.098 + 0.080 + 0.028 = 1.105
A complete explanation of how to prepare the Composite Escala-
tion index is found in the SAR "Preparation and Review" Guide,
DoD 7000. 3-G, page 4-1 to 4-14.
8
.
Calculated Program Funding (Base Year $)
a. Current § Prior Years through to Complete - Enter
the base year dollar amount obtained by dividing "Program Fund
ing (Escalated $)" in each fiscal year by the corresponding
"Composite Escalation Index."
b. Total - Enter the calculated total program funding
(this appropriation) in base year dollars. This amount is the




The "Calculated Program Funding (Base Year $)"
row may not be the same as the "Program Funding (Base Year S) M
row. The reasons for differences between the two base year
programs include:
(1) improper escalation calculation; and
(2) not adjusting the program base year estimate
in years where "actual" escalation rates differ from those
projected in the budget.
9. On the attached worksheets the cost growth due to Un-
recognized Inflation equals the Program Funding (Base R) minus
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BUDGETING FOR INFLATION
Problem : Current budaetary procedures are not sufficient to protect planned
Defense programs from erosion due to inflation. As a result, recent Defense
budaets have less real arowth than olanned because of the subseauent effects of
higher than anticipated inflation. The problem is most severe in major weaoon
programs that spend out slowly and necessarily are priced under the assumotion
of rapidly declining inflation rates in future years.
Background : 0MB Circular A-ll permits inflation budgeting throughout the
government, including all Oefense purchases from the private sector. In the
past, however. 0M8 directed rates for inflation have been materially below
actual inflation, leadinq to difficulties in budget execution.
Errors in the forecast rate of inflation affect DoD significantly because
defense programs are usually fully funded in the year when they are authorized,
although the monies may not be spent for several years. The full funding in-
cludes an allowance for inflation, based on the 0MB forecast. If the forecast
proves too optimistic, the appropriated amounts will be inadeauate, since tnere
is no provision for subsequent adjustments to offset unanticipated inflation.
Moreover, in recent years this problem has been exacerbated by another develop-
ment. The recently inaugurated Department of Commerce defense deflator, wnich
is based upon a special survey of defense goods, indicates that prices for
defense purchases have been risinq more rapidly than those of most goods and
services in the economy, as measured by the GNP deflator. Yet under current
procedures OoD must use a GNP deflator for its budget olanninq, not a defense
deflator that properly accounts for how its purchases differ from the economy-
wide average.
Discussion of Alternatives : Three solutions for reducing the loss to inflation
have been proposed: [Tl I separate deflator and supplemental appropriations to
adjust for the error in the forecast; (2) budget at 0MB projected rates and
seek supplemental appropriations if realized inflation exceeds those projected
rates: (3) request the Congress to aopropriate Oefense programs without regard
for any future inflation and then later add whatever amount may be needed to
cover inflation.
1. A Separate Deflator : This proposal calls for use of a separate Defense
deflator, based on the established differences in the Defense and the GNP
"market baskets," and supplemental appropriations if inflation exceeds the
forecast or rescissions if the forecast is too high.
Pro :
If a more appropriate index were accurately projected, then inflation under-
funding would be less likely.
The Commerce Defense Price Series supports the conclusion that a separate index




0MB has objected strongly and publicly to a separate (Defense deflator. A
separate deflator may be viewed by some as backing away from the President's
economic program.
It would be a sianal, especially to the defense contractor, that our program
could be effectively "indexed" and there would be less incentive for efficiency
and cost reduction.
The low estimate of inflation probably results as much from a low forecast as
from using the "wrong" index. Historically, a separate incex, projected con-
sistently with the economic assumptions, would still have resulted in the need
for supplemental appropriations.
2. Budget at QMS Projected Rates and Seek Supplementals : This proposal
incrementally funds the adaed inflation as it is measured and reported through
the Commerce Defense Price Index. The 0MB projected indices would be used in
the initial reauests.
Pro :
Does not reauire 0MB to recede from the strong objection to a separate Defense
index.
Evidences continued suoport of the President's economic program *n<j is consis-
tent with the Secretary's testimony that he will submit a supplemental if the
inflation estimates are too low.
Hedges the risk of conaressional disapproval by splitting the inflation funding
and continuing to support the full funding concept.
Fits into the current budaet procedures of both the legislative and executive
branches with only slight modification.
Funds inflation at the aDpropriation level with the applicable Service or
Agency allocating the funds by line item.
Con :
Produces the inflation fund^'na later than a separate index would.
May not provide full recovery for inflation since 0MB or Congress will proDaaly
discount the request to provide an incentive for management.
3. Constant Dollar Budaet and Incremental Funding : This proDosal calls for the
Congress initially to appropriate amounts for Defense without regard for futi*-e
Inflation and then later to aopropriate whatever is needed to cover inflation,
thereby maintaining Defense purchasing power. The appropriations to increase
Defense funding, by the amount prices had increased, would De made in incre-




Incremental funding would eliminate loss of program to inflation if it could be
fully implemented and supported by the Congress. The primary objective is to
get Defense out of the inflation projection business entirely. Instead, DoO
would concentrate on pricing the program accurately in constant dollars, based
on the premise that DoD would do better taking chances with explicit aownst-eam
cuts than risking the implicit taxation of Defense programs that has resulted
from low estimates of inflation.
It would ease the turmoil that results when the economic assumptions are
changed several times a year, in particular just as the budaet is put to bed in
December of each year.
Inflation is incrementally funded by all our NATO allies and Japan.
Con :
Unless estimates are in constant actual year dollars, agreement with 0MB en
estimates of current and budget year rates would still be required, even if
subsequent years could be excluded.
An explicit allowance for unbudgeted Oefense inflation, required to compute the
Federal deficit, would reveal aggregate inflation assumptions unless the con-
stant dollar approach were applied government wide.
Although it is possible this can be done without upsetting the present motiva-
tion to bid on defense contracts, it may well involve the ass?umption of larger
contingent liabilities by the Government, because less of the total funds
necessary to procure a given proqram will be in hand at the time of contract
negotiation. U.S. allies have to varying degrees managed this problem, but
their relationship with industry is different than ours.
Because Conqress has been hesitant in the past to grant supplemental for
inflation, there is substantial risk of major cuts in the increments. The FRG
and other Western European countries now are discovering these risks of incre-
mental budqeting as fiscal pressures begin to force cuts in programs alreaoy
well underway.
Verifiable data on the actual cost experience of at least major procurement
contractors will be required. We do not presently have a system that provioes
such information. Setting it up may be difficult, particularly at the subcon-
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